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Abstract:
The land market and the associated land-development-control mechanism in China have
been experiencing a series of reforms since the 1990s, of which Land Conveyance Reform
(LCR) in 2004 is a very recent and an important one. LCR-the formal procedure to
transfer the land-use rights (LURs) from the government to other users-has been used
together with land use planning as institutional tools to generate and distribute the
revenues for both local municipal government and real estate developers. Meanwhile, a
large-scale government-led deindustrialization has been going on sine 1995 in city of
Beijing, where many State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) were relocated from downtown
Beijing to suburbs or other cities.
I studied the change of the LCR from the former negotiation approach to the current
auction approach. I analyzed its institutional impact on the land-use planning decision-
making process and its social impacts on the deindustrialization process, specifically, the
economic and social condition of working staff of SOEs. I conducted an empirical study
in Beijing to investigate both institutional and social impacts.
The LCR has caused an institutional shift in the land-use planning process, from the
former "developer-coordinated process" to the current "local government-coordinated
process." However, that shift did not solve the social problems caused by
deindustrialization and SOE privatization; instead, it just slows down the occurrence of
the problems.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Research Background
Economic reforms since 1978 have brought fundamental changes to the social and
economic development of the People's Republic of China (China). As China
restructures its socialist economy, market mechanisms are gradually replacing central-
planning controls in many segments of the economy. One key component of the
rapidly growing Chinese economy is the large-scale urban redevelopment in many
Chinese cities, which converts the former land uses in downtown areas into
supposedly more economically efficient uses.
Land resources, the largest asset of the state, were traditionally administrated and
allocated by means of central planning-land was owned by the government and
normally administratively allocated free to users without any charges. It was not until
the Land Market Reform in the late 1980s that the Land-Use Right (LUR) as a
concept of transferable land leasehold came into existence. Since then, a new era of
lawful transactions of urban land has been opened, facilitating a large amount of
urban development in most Chinese cities, especially in the cases of the relocation of
state-owned enterprises (SOE). The need for urban land reform and the setting-up of
the urban land market arose because land had to be economically utilized in order to
provide a source of revenue to both central and local governments and create social
wealth for the whole nation (Zhu 2005).
As a result, the interventions on the land market and the land-development-control
mechanism, which regulates the process and the outcome of urban land
redevelopment, are changing the political dynamics both among various agencies at
local municipal level, and between local government and central government. In
addition, in the cases of downtown SOE relocation, which is happening in many big
Chinese cities, they are also reshaping the social landscape in the downtown areas.
The land market and the associated land-development-control process have been
experiencing a series of reforms since the 1990s, of which the Land Conveyance
Reform (LCR) in 2004 is a very recent and an important one. Land conveyance-the
formal procedure to transfer the LUR from the government to other users-
experienced a major reform on August 31, 2004, in a regulation that mandates that all
land transactions after that date must be conducted through auction, while tender and
negotiation were used as two additional alternatives before that.
Beijing, as the capital city of China, is a good example for the empirical study. It
traditionally had large amounts of industrial land in the downtown area, of which
many were SOEs. Many of those SOEs were relocated to suburbs or other cities
since the mid 1990s and that left lots of vacant industrial land for downtown
redevelopment in Beijing. These redevelopments are changing the downtown social
structure and the spatial distribution of low-income people, of whom many are the
working class of SOEs. The original danweil communities adopted in the planned
economy period has broken down-they are being replaced by the new commercial
housing in most of the residential redevelopment cases.
1.2 Research Objectives
Because the LCR is a very recent policy, there are very few studies about it. Many
scholars (Yeh 2005, Zhu 2003, Xu 2000) participated in the initiation and
encouragement of this reform, because the land auction is a transparent market
process that will increase the price of the leased land. However, my initial research
shows that besides the increased land price, there are significant impacts on the
institutional settings of the land-development-control mechanism. This institutional
impact changed the way of converting industrial land into other uses, thus greatly
affected the people who used to live in danwei communities.
Therefore, there are three general objectives of this research. First, the historical
review on land-market reforms and land-use policy evolution will provide us a better
understanding of the context of China's rapid urbanization and economic
development. The evolution derives from the land property-right reform, land-
conveyance reform, and land-use-regulation reform. All these made land in China not
only a means of production, but also an economic commodity that can be transacted.
1 State-owned enterprises in socialist countries, or danwei in China, are a link in social redistribution chains. The
danwei, literally meaning work unit in English, is a profound socialist institution that used to be essential and is, to a
certain extent, still important to Chinese urban residents. The function of danweis is more than just organizing required
production. They are a mechanism through which the state distributes socialist welfare to workers (Zhu, 2005)
Second, the study of the LCR and its institutional impacts helps to establish the link
between the study of the land market and the study of the land-development-control
mechanism, understanding what the interactive relationship between these two is.
This link has been little studied. The empirical study in Beijing also shows the
changing dynamics among various existing agencies and newly established agencies
during the land-redevelopment process.
Third, the focus on the social impacts of LCR demonstrates what the social cost of
large-scale downtown redevelopment is specifically, the changing social structure
caused from the land-use policies being adopted. I investigate the land-use policy's
impacts on low-income people, while most of analysts have studied the low-income
people from a housing-policy perspective. I also investigate an alternative non-market
approach in Beijing in order to understand what the social outcomes of the industry
relocation were.
1.3 Research Questions and Hypothesis
In the research, I examine the impact of the LCR on both the institutional settings of
the land-development-control process and the social outcomes of SOE relocation.
My empirical study mainly has two parts: (1) an institutional study of how the LCR
from the negotiation approach to the auction approach affects the interaction among
stakeholders during the land-conversion decision-making process, and how this
change affects the benefits' redistribution among various agencies, and (2) a social-
impact study of how the LCR affects the living conditions of working-class people
during the SOE relocation process, in two ways: (a) affordability of new housing
development for the original working class and (b) access to social services.
1.3.1 Research Questions
I define the land-development-control mechanism as the decision-making process
that involves those in the public sector, private sector, and residents, to analyze and
recommend the way to transfer present land uses to the future uses. This mechanism
has strong influences on land prices, and the real estate market development,
producing much revenue for the local and central government. It also affects the way
that real estate developers interact with government. More importantly, the
mechanism has been closely linked with the social outcomes of the relocation of
SOEs and their working-class people. Therefore, it is important to study the
following questions:
(1) How does the LCR from negotiation to auction affect the institutional setting of
the land-conversion decision making process and the local land-development-control
mechanism?
(2) Does negotiation still exist in this new approach, and if it does, does it differ from
before? What is the role of the SOE in the new mechanism?
(3) Has the new land-development-control mechanism improved the affordability of
downtown Beijing for low-income SOE staff? If not, why not?
For the institutional-impact analysis, I review the former land-development-control
process and differentiate the changing roles of the existing agencies and new agencies.
I especially focus on the role of planning agencies and land agencies during this new
process, studying their interaction with other city agencies and developers. For the
social-impact analysis, I focus on the housing part of the original SOE land. I use the
concept of "inclusionary zoning" to test the social impacts on the working class.
Inclusionary zoning is a zoning resolution widely used in the United States that
requires or encourages private market-rate housing developers to provide or pay for
affordable housing units. (Kayden 2005)
1.3.2 Hypothesis
I hypothesize that the LCR from the traditional negotiation method to an auction
method strengthened the intervention of the municipal government during the land-
development-control process, thus bringing more consideration to the working-class
people in SOEs. However, the current land-use planning mechanism in China,
specifically the Detailed Development Control Plan (DDCP), could not
fundamentally solve these social problems, in terms of providing both housing and
social services to low-income staff.
1.4 Methodology
To test my hypothesis, I use both qualitative and quantitative methods. I use three
types of qualitative research methods (interviews, case studies, and literature review),
while for the quantitative method, I collected data on industrial land conversion in
Beijing and relate it with other employment and investment data. I compare the
difference of various parameters before and after the LCR. My research is composed
of two parts: (1) an empirical study of the relationship among SOEs, developers, local
government, and planning authorities after the LCR; and (2) a study of how the LCR
is related with the deindustrialization process in Beijing, and how that impacted the
danwei system after the LCR, which affected the working class of SOEs. I use
qualitative methods for the first part, including interviews with government officials,
specific case studies on SOEs, and a historical review of land-use regulations. For the
second part, I use both qualitative and quantitative methods, which include a survey
in Beijing and a case study of the Beijing Textile Plant (Jing Mian).
Beijing as the capital city of China has a large amount of industrial land in downtown
areas, specifically, near the east fourth ring road. Most of that industrial land has been
redeveloped into residential uses and office uses. Therefore, it serves as a case to
illustrate the social and institutional impacts of the LCR. The case of Beijing also
helps me to give explicit explanations on the government regulations on urban land
leasing and the impact on the outcomes of the market reform. The policy
implications regarding land-use policy and impacts on the working class from this
research could also be of great value to policymakers, developers, and other parties in
this reform process.
1.5 Data
I obtained macro economic indices such as Gross Domestic Product (GDP),
population density, SOE employment, and investment on real estate development
from the statistical bureaux of the state and Beijing municipal government. At the
micro level, I obtained urban land-leasing data on LUR sales from the Beijing Land
Reserve and Management Center and the existing literature. I used data of SOE
relocation and industrial land conversion in Beijing from the Beijing Industry
Adjustment Plan and Beijing Master Plan (2004- 2020). I obtained Beijing Textile
Plant data from interviews with the plant managers and planners in Beijing Planning
Institute, as well as from the Planning Report on Beijing Textile Plant, provided by
the Beijing Planning Institute.
1.6 Organization of the Study
This study is organized into 6 chapters:
In Chapter 1, I provide an outline of this research, which consists of the introduction
of the study, research objectives, research question and hypothesis, research data, and
the methodology used in this study.
In Chapter 2, I describe the background of LCR-the historic review of the
evolution of land policy in China and the existing literature on key issues. It consists
of land property rights, land conveyance, and land market reform. I also review the
land-use planning system in China.
In Chapter 3, I propose a conceptualized framework for the analysis of research
problems and the hypotheses to be tested with the empirical model. I also provide
five major arguments to show the logic of the framework, given the unique land and
planning context in China.
In Chapter 4, I first explore the deindustrialization process in Beijing since the mid
1980s, including the industry relocation and industrial land conversion to provide a
picture of industrial land redevelopment before and after the LCR. Then, I study the
institutional impacts of the LCR, from various institutional perspectives.
In Chapter 5, I present an empirical study on social impacts of the LCR and
deindustrialization process in Beijing. Finally, I conducted a unique case study of non-
market development as an alternative approach to that of market development.
In Chapter 6, I summarize the research findings and contribution together with the
existing limitations in this study. I also provide some further policy implications and
suggestions for future research.
CHAPTER 2
EVOLUTION OF LAND POLICY AND LITERATURE REVIEW
To provide a context for the LCR as well as the deindustrialization process, I briefly
review the land market reform since the late 1980s and the land-use planning system
in China.
2.1 Introduction
As China conducts various economic reforms and restructures its socialist economy,
market mechanisms are gradually replacing central-planning controls in many
segments of the economy. This transformation is also reflected in both its urban land
market and the land-use planning mechanism.
The land-market reform in the late 1980s made land in China not only a means of
production, but also an economic commodity that can be transacted. The reform has
greatly reshaped the decision-making process for central government, local
government, and developers. It also led to a tension between the central government
and local municipal government in terms of distributing the revenues from the land
market and redevelopment of downtown areas. For the land-market reform, major
changes occurred: land property rights and land-conveyance method.
Land-use planning, legally named as Detail Development-Control Plan (DDCP) in
China, is the key element determining what land uses and land-use intensity is
allowable for the new development. It is the way for municipal governments to
intervene in local land development. Land-use planning has experienced institutional
changes over the past two decades. The change is driven by the changing economic
system and by two new organizations-the local developmental state and danwei-
enterprises (Zhu, 2005).
2.2 Land Market
The overall economic reforms and the open-door policy implemented in China in the
late 1970s have helped drive the urban land reform towards a market orientation. The
need for urban land reform and the setting-up for the urban land market arose
because land had to be economically utilized in order to provide a source of revenue
to both central and local governments and create social wealth for the whole nation
(Zhu 2005). Urban land, which traditionally functioned as a public asset in China, has
been experiencing major changes since 1980s. The changes include property rights
and the land-conveyance method.
2.2.1 Land Property Right
Beginning with the creation of socialist China in 1949, the central government
collected land from former private owners and controlled it as state-owned assets. At
that time, the local government allocated land to various users through administrative
allocation, which means that land was allocated free to users without any charges
(Yeh, 2005). Most SOEs obtained their land through this method, and, many have
occupied that land since then. However, urban land was not considered to be a
commodity according to Marxist principles of socialist people's ownership; thus,
economic transactions of land were deemed illegal between owner and users.2 The
free administrative allocation system created much land squandering-land users tend
to ask for much more land than they actually needed. (Zhu, 2005)
In the late 1980s, land reform started in several southern cities in China. Early
practices occurred in Shenzhen and Guangzhou, which leased land to some foreign
investors. It was not until the First Session of the Seventh People's Congress in 1987
that paying for the transfer of land-use rights (LUR) was made official. The clause
"The right to the use of land may be transferred in accordance with law" was added
to Article 10, Section 4 of the constitution. This amendment was approved by the
National People's Congress on April 12, 1988. (Tang 1989, Yeh, 2005) After that,
there are three main types of land ownership in China: (1) rural land, which is
collectively owned by farmers; (2) administratively allocated land-urban land, which
is owned by the state but occupied by SOEs through administrative allocation; and
(3) leased land-urban land, which is owned by the state but the LURs are
transferred to the users through a payment (Yeh, 2005). The transition in China has
been a gradualist approach, which has led to a dual land market-the coexistence of
both a leased land market and administratively allocated land.
2 Clause 4, Article 10 of the 1982 Constitution stipulates: "Urban land belongs to the state.. .No organization or
individual may appropriate, buy, sell, or lease land, or unlawfully transfer it in any way."
2.2.2 Land Conveyance
Land conveyance is the formal procedure to transfer a LUR from the government to
land users. Three methods were used before 2004 for land conveyance: negotiation,
tender, and auction. Negotiation refers to the selling of the land leasehold through
negotiations between two parties: the local government as a seller and developers as
buyers. Compared to negotiation, tender (developers are invited to join and propose a
price for the land and the highest price is selected) and auction (through an open
land-auction market) are the two ways that allocate land through the market
mechanism. These two methods tend to a have higher prices for selling the land
leasehold than negotiation. However, in 2000, they occupied a lower percentage in
the whole land-conveyance market-less than 20% for both of them, while
negotiation occupied more than 80% (Figure 2-1) (Yeh, 2005). Take the city of
Shenzhen as an example, during 1988-1999, 36.4 sq. km. (square kilometers) of land
was allocated through land leasing of which 97.7% was by negotiation. (Zhu, 2005)
Since 2002, a series of regulations were announced and put into use by the Ministry
of Land Resource and State Council about the LCR. The Decree No. 11 from
Ministry of Land Resource announced that all land conveyance after August 31, 2004
has to be through an open-market auction instead of negotiation. These changes
greatly affected the land-conveyance market, and made the land transaction a more
transparent process, and increased the land price. However, very few studies have
been done on these LCR and their impacts on land redevelopment in downtown
areas in China.
Figure 2-1: Comparison of Land-Conveyance Methods in China, 1993- 2000
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2.3 Land-Use Plan
In China, there is a two-tier structure of urban planning: master planning and
development-control planning. Master planning usually deals with micro-level
strategic issues of a city, and the Master Plan has to be approved by upper-level
government officials. 3 Development-control planning deals with specific land
development in urban areas and is supposed to regulate the functional and physical
outcomes of the development. Development controls in China-called "zoning
I The master plan of big cities has to be approved by the State Council.
regulations" in the United States-has more direct effects and stronger legal impacts
on influencing or encouraging specific land-development outcomes than master
planning. However, development-control planning is not conducted only by planning
authorities in municipalities. Rather, it is a long and complex mechanism that
involves different city agencies, developers, SOEs, and they need to interact with each
other in various ways, depending on in which step of the work and city the case is. I
call this mechanism the "institutional setting" of development-control planning and it
affects the physical and economic outcome of land development. The institutional
setting of the land-development-control mechanism differs from before and after the
economic reforms in late 1970s.
Before the Economic Reforms
Socialist development was highly centralized by a central-planning system. The urban
land had to be given to specific users with public ownership. Most of those uses are
specific public projects, which first need to be approved by the Economic Planning
Commission (EPC). Land users could then apply to urban-planning authorities for
site-selection approval and finally pay the compensation fee to the original land
occupier (Figure 2-2). Urban planning authorities have very limited power during this
process.
Figure 2-2: Land-Allocation Process in China Prior to 1979
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Source: Zhu, 1999
After the Economic Reforms
City-planning authorities began to play a stronger role after the economic reforms.
The "one report and two permits" system is used as the legal procedure of
transferring the land use from the original use to the proposed one. According to the
1989 City Planning Act, prior permission is required before implementing all land-
development projects, whether the developers of these projects obtain land from
administrative allocation or from the land market. Developers need to submit
development proposals, which should include the proposed land uses, development
density, and open space. All development proposals are vetted by the local planning
authorities under the supervision of city governments. The planning authority,
through the "one report and two permits" system depicted in the 1989 Act evaluates
development proposals according to the planning intention in the city plans and other
government requirements or considerations (Ng and Xu, 2000). I include a detailed
analysis of the process in Chapter 4.
CHAPTER 3
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND MAJOR ARGUMENTS
For establishing the theoretical framework for the empirical study of institutional and
social impacts of LCR in Beijing, I use five major arguments: property rights,
institutional, legal, fiscal, and deindustrialization. I explain them later in this chapter.
3.1 Conceptual Framework
In the transition period of China's urbanization, both central and local governments
have been trying to navigate the direction of reform towards a market-oriented
approach through various policies and reforms. Urban land, as one of the key state
assets, has not only become a means of production through a series of reforms, but
also an important revenue resource for local and central government. The reforms
and policies made related with land market and land-use regulation have greatly
shaped the behavior of the government, developers, and SOEs; thus, they have
become a key institutional tool for changing the political structure and dynamics. The
social impacts of these reforms-specifically, the condition of SOE staff, in the case
of SOE relocation and downtown industrial land redevelopment-have usually
become the externality of the land reforms. However, this externality could either
become a barrier or a driver for the land reform, and sometimes, for the more
fundamental political reform, depending on how the social impact is treated by the
government.
Therefore, the study framework is composed of three parts: (1) intervention
modification, (2) institutional impacts, and (3) social impacts. They are linked by the
two major organizations in this reform process-local governments and SOEs. I
place the study in the context of the institutional change: from Gradualism to
Dualism, and to Decentralization, and to Localism, and to the most recent
Recentralization. (Figure 3-1)
3.1.1 Intervention Modification
In order to examine the impacts of the land conveyance reform (LCR) as the
intervention from local government in the land development process, I explore other
related interventions. In this first part, I examine the interacting relationships among
these interventions caused by the LCR.
The intervention in land development in China consists of two steps: the land
conveyance and the land-development-control mechanism. Land conveyance is the
formal procedure to transfer the Land-Use Right (LUR) from the government to the
potential users. Land conveyance, especially in the context where urban land is a
public asset, is essential in affecting the future use of the redevelopment. In this study,
I categorize it into two aspects: land property rights and land-conveyance method.
The LCR belongs to the land-conveyance method, but is closely related with land
property rights and the land-development-control mechanism. The different
Figure 3-1 Conceptual Framework: Institutional and Social Impacts of Land Conveyance Reform in China
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conveyance methods lead to different interactions and dynamics among the
government, developer, and SOEs. Property rights are the matters of liability-they
are supposed to regulate the specific rights and responsibilities for the land users,
although this is not yet the case in China.
Land-development control is the decision-making process that involves the public
sector, private sector, SOEs and residents to analyze and recommend the way to
transfer present land uses to the future uses. It includes the government-led land-use
planning and land-use regulations process as well as developer and SOE participation.
The government-led land-use planning and regulation process in China, known as
"one report and two permits," is the formal process to review previous land uses and
propose new uses, including several key parameters for new development, such as
land uses, floor-area-ratio (FAR) and building height. This process involves various
local government agencies, and differs depending on the conveyance method.
3.1.2 Institutional Impact
Since the fiscal reform in the 1990s, political benefits and financial revenues have
become the two major reasons driving the reform in central and local governments.
LCR as the way of changing the conveyance method from negotiation to auction has
influences on both political and financial patterns among governments. It thus leads
to the institutional change of the land-development-control mechanism and in the
way different government agencies work with each other.
During this land-conversion process, various government agencies are involved:
central government, local municipal government, functional agencies, and some
emerging agencies. Each of them has its own scope and responsibilities, which
empowers them to be unique in the land-development-control process. The local
government agency, specifically, the urban planning authority plays an important role
during this process.
3.1.3 Social Impact
The third part of the framework is the social-impact analysis. The previous two parts
of the study of the land-policy reform itself and its institutional impact among the
government agencies have set up a good context to analyze the social impacts, which
appear as either a positive or negative externality of the land policy reform, depending
on how "social" is defined and how "impact" is treated.
Chinese cities have been experiencing a government-led large-scale deindustrialization
process in the last decade. SOEs have been relocated from downtown areas to
suburbs or other cities, leaving large amounts of vacant industrial land in downtown
for redevelopment (Polenske, 2005). My study focuses on the social impacts of LCR
on the working staff of the SOEs during SOEs' relocation process, and more
specifically, on the mid and low-income staff. Since the central government-led
reform and restructuring to the SOEs, the working staff of SOEs have become the
marginalized people in China's transitional society. Especially when the
deindustrialization has been used as a strategy to finance the industry restructuring,
three aspects of working class are essential parameters of the social impact: (1) the
affordability of the original site in downtown for the SOE staff, (2) the provision of
social services for low-income staff, and (3) the provisions of the danwei4 welfare
system.
3.2 Major Arguments for the Framework
The reason and logic of this conceptual framework build on China's unique urban
and institutional context, which I outline in the following five major arguments: (1)
property rights, (2) institutional, (3) legal, (4) fiscal, and (5) deindustrialization. I do
not use all of these arguments for this analysis, but just for establishing the
framework. Rather than using the arguments for a broad discussion of these
perspectives, I focus on specific points related with the framework of this study.
3.2.1 Property-Rights Argument
I argue that the land-conveyance mechanism, including both the land property-rights
system and conveyance method, does have an influence on the land-development-
control process. Land conveyance, especially in the context of ex-Socialist countries
where urban land is publicly owned or where the land property right is experiencing
4 State-owned enterprises in socialist countries, or danwei in China, are a link in social redistribution chains. The
danwei, literally meaning work unit in English, is a profound socialist institution that used to be essential and is, to
certain extent, still important to Chinese urban residents. The function of danweis is more than just organizing required
production. They are a mechanism through which the state distributes socialist welfare to workers (Zhu, 2005)
the transition from poorly defined to clearly defined, is essential in affecting the
future use of the redevelopment. It also affects the way the decision is made on that
type of redevelopment.
Before the Land Market Reform (LMR) in China, urban land was not allowed to be
transferred to other users as a commercial commodity. The LMR created the concept
of Land Use Right (LUR) and differentiated that with the concept of land ownership.
The LUR, which could be purchased by individual land users, is fundamentally the
long-term land leasehold, while ownership of urban land, which has to be state-
owned, is more like a political and ideological symbol during China's transition period.
Therefore, the first-round distribution of LURs to various SOEs after the LMR was
actually the process of distributing the public assets from the notion of "state" to
certain State-owned entities. The notion of the LURs and land ownership was not
well defined since the beginning of the LMR-that created more flexibilities and
opportunities for the government during the transition period (Qi, 1999). However, it
also brought numerous conflicts and problems between SOEs and government in the
recent decade when many of the SOEs want to relocate and transfer their LURs.
A better defined land property-rights system, on the one hand, will affect how the
land-development-control process could intervene on the land users, and more
importantly, what compensation or costs government needs to make to enforce that
intervention. On the other hand, the conveyance method, as the formal process and
regulation of how the LURs should be transferred from government to land users,
will influence the participation method by government agencies, developers, and
SOEs before the well-defined land property rights system is established.
3.2.2 Institutional Argument
The land-development-related institutional settings in China are unique and are
changing. Land-use planning and land-use regulations are major government actions
used by the state to intervene in the redevelopment of vacant SOE land in urban
areas. However, the notion of "government" actually consists of various agencies at
various levels, all of which participate in the land-development decision-making
process in different ways. After the Land Market Reform, the land redevelopment,
specifically, the conveyance of LURs, has become the major revenue sources for the
government (Yeh, 2005). In the transition period from a traditional Socialist ideology
to a market approach, the evaluation by political officials is usually related to the local
economic performance; therefore, the land redevelopment is associated not only with
revenue generation, but political performance as well.
However, the Land Market Reform opened a new era of market-mechanism land
development, but did not clearly define the land property rights. This ambiguous land
property rights system and the local institutional settings have led to many conflicts
among agencies. The LCR is, on the one hand, changing the dynamics, benefit
distribution, and development rights among these agencies; thus, it becomes the
reason why an "institutional impact" will exist. On the other hand, the tension has
existed between the central government and local municipal government since the
beginning of China's open door policy in 1979 (Table 3-1).
Table 3-1: Institutional Change in China Since 1979
Institutional Change Period Events
Gradualism Late 1970s to present China's economic reform
Dualism Late 1970s to present Consequence of the Gradualism
De-centralization Mid 1980s to present Fiscal Reform
Localism Late 1980s to early 2000s Land Market Reform
Re-centralization Early 2000s to present A series of corruption investigations
from central government to the
officials in some major cities in 2004
Source: Author's conclusion and Zhu (2005)
Gradualism was used as the approach during earlier reform period in order to ensure
the stability during China's transition. Dualism has become one of the consequences
of that approach and was reflected on many sectors, including the land market. The
leased land that is transferred through the market approach and administratively
allocated land that is given to SOEs and agencies free of charge coexist in China's
land market (Yeh, 2005). The Fiscal Reform in the mid 1980s and Land Market
Reform in the late 1980s have led to a De-centraliZation and therefore Locali.Zation-
local municipal government since the 1980s had more pressure, motivation, and
jurisdiction to obtain the economic development and fiscal capacities. The recent land
reforms and several arrests to the very high-level officials indicate the Re-centraliZation,
which has been going on since the year 2000.
3.2.3 Legal Argument
For the legal context in Beijing of the LCR adopted in 2004, I argue that although the
planning-related laws and regulations have improved, they are still inadequate. The
land-development-control mechanism does not have a strong legal support in terms
of the procedure and decision making.
LUR provides land users the right to develop the land in certain ways that are allowed
by the government land-use plan. The right to develop the land is the legal
component of land rights and should be defined by land-use planning, which
regulates the land market according to how land should be developed (Zhu 2005).
Therefore, the inappropriate government intervention on the land uses actually
intervenes in the legal land-use rights of individuals, which are protected by the land-
transaction contract. In the United States, if the intervention is in such a way that it
causes economic hardship to the property owners, then, such an intervention is called
a "regulatory taking."
The land-development intervention, as explained before, consists of two steps: land
conveyance and land-development-control mechanism. Before LCR was adopted, the
laws and regulations related with these two types of intervention were extremely
inadequate: land property rights were not well defined; negotiation was widely used as
the conveyance method to transfer the LURs, which caused numerous conflicts;
many land conveyances were conducted not through the legal land market, but the
illegal black market (Yeh, 2005); and more importantly, there is no law or regulation
about the specific procedure and mechanism of the land-use planning process, which
is the key component of land-development-control. Land-use planning is highly
discretionary and decision-making in the planning process is not transparent at all
(Zhu, 2005).
Two major actions improved the situation at the land-conveyance stage: the LCR
adopted in 2002 and the Property Law, which was drafted in 2005 and is currently
being reviewed by the central government. The new Property Law aims to protect the
private ownership of certain properties and assets. The land property rights will also
be better defined in that law, so that the boundary will be drawn between
"appropriate intervention" and a "regulatory taking." The LCR regulates the specific
way of transferring the LURs, which is through land auction.
However, the land-development-control related law and regulations did not improve
since then (Table 3-2). During the land-use planning process, local planning
authorities do not have legal support for their decision-making; thus, they are often
affected by the higher level government officials in municipal government or other
agencies. The discretionary and illegal decisions were made sometimes made in order
Table 3-2: Major Planning and Planning-Related Regulations in Beijing
Planning Law/Regulation
City Planning Act (1989)
Method of City Planning (1991)
Temporary Regulation of
Beijing Urban Construction and
Planning Management (1984-
1992)
Beijing City Planning Regulation
(1992- present)
Source: Author's survey and Xu and Ng (1998)
Planning-Related Law/Regulation
Central
The Working Procedure of
Administratively Allocated Urban
Construction Land (1996)
Beijing Temporary Regulations on
Transferring Land Use Right of State-
Owned Land Through Land Auction
(2002)
Management Method of State-Owned
Construction Land in Beijing (2005)
Temporary Method on Land Reservation
and First Level Development (2005)
Land Management Law (1986, revised in
1988, 1998, 2004)
Regulation of Land Acquisition for State
Construction (1982)
Environmental Protection Law (1989)
Provisional Regulations on Transferring
Land-Use Right of State-Owned Land in
Cities and Towns (1990)
Temporary Regulation of Land
Management for Foreign Investment
(1990)
Real Estate Management Act (1995)
Regulations on Transferring Land Use
Right of State-Owned Land Through Land
Auction (2002)
Local i
to maximize the government's or some officials' profits, while neglecting the public
interest.s Although some appeals from land users were accepted by the court in late
1990s, it does not help the legal environment, because China adopted the Continental
Law system instead of the Common Law, much of which was by custom and
precedent rather than by written code.
3.2.4 Fiscal Argument
When I examine the land policy reform in China, I find that one of the fundamental
drivers for it is actually the motivation of local municipal government to gain more
revenues. The Land Market Reform in the late 1980s captured that motivation and
made urban land as the key implementation tool to realize such revenures. However,
what created this motivation were the changing fiscal relationships between central
and local government, which happened before the Land Market Reform.
The central government in China since 1949 had a considerable control over various
fiscal issues like: fiscal policy, budgetary authority, fiscal management systems, and
some extraordinary fiscal powers. It also adopted a unified budget and presided over
a budgetary process that includes the budgets of the central government, the
provinces, and sub-provincial units. It was not until the Cultural Revolution in 1966-
1976 that the local government began to acquire more autonomy through greater
5 A study by Xu (2001) showed that during the period of 1992-1996, the mayor of Guangzhou issued at least 2000
memos to the city planning authority to request planners to follow his suggestions in dealing with development
applications. (Xu, 2001, Zhu, 2005)
budgetary authority, longer contractual periods, and greater responsibility than before
for managing budgetary surpluses and deficits (Oksenberg, 1991). A process of fiscal
and state administrative decentralization was initiated as early as the 1980s as part of
China's Open Door policy. The local governments were considered the key factor for
the implementation of China's reform. Since then, local governments began assuming
primary responsibility for local economic and social development. They obtained
authority to determine prices, approve or disapprove the creation of new firms, and
make major investments with bank loans or local extra-budgetary funds (Liu, Tao,
2004). Qian and Weingast (1998) emphasize that it was due to the fiscal reform that
local governments achieved the motivation and incentive to foster local economic
development and expand the tax base.
3.2.5 Deindustrialization Argument
I focus my land policy studies on the deindustrialization process, specifically, the
relocation process of industrial SOEs. SOEs, also called Danwei-enterprises in China6,
are special entities in the Socialist context. Before the Cultural Revolution, on the one
hand, they were responsible for nearly all the manufacturing production for the newly
established communist China and hired most of the urban employees. On the other
hand, they also provided various kinds of social services for their staff. The dual role
of production and social welfare provider made them the essential mechanism
through which the state distributed socialist welfare to workers (Zhu, 2005). A well-
6 Danwei is the pronunciation in Chinese. In some literature, it is called "work-unit".
developed and vivid description about danwei-enterprises is hard to find, but John
Friedmann's (2005) conclusion gives us some sense:
Until well into the reform period, the danwei was a self-contained, walled compound that
enshrined not only a productive enterprise or service institution such as hospital or
university, but also a "small society" that provided for a complete way of life and
personal security into old age. The efficient use of resources was not a major operational
criterion of the danwei. Labor mobility was minimal, and children who grew up in the
compound would typically inherit their parents' jobs on their retirement or be
reassigned to other tasks within the unit. Among those who belonged to the danwei,
there was substantial material equality: they all ate out of the same pot, so to speak, but
the world beyond the gate had only a shadowy existence for them.
However, this ideal socialist model began to break down after the 1980s, especially
from the 1990s-the danwei-enterprises began to be closed or transferred into joint
ventures due to political and social considerations. What went with this revolution
was the change of ideology from the former "single state-owned assets system" to the
later "multiple-ownership system." Because the danwe-enterprises were essential to
the Socialist China's economy before its reform period, many of them were located in
downtown areas. Therefore, the deindustrialization process in the past decade has
caused many of the SOEs to be relocated from downtown to city suburbs or even to
other cities and regions.
This government-led deindustrialization process has created much vacant industrial
land in the downtown area of many big Chinese cities; meanwhile, it has also created
considerable unemployment and labor relocation. It has been changing the social and
economic landscape of Chinese cities and has not been deeply studied (Polenske,
2005). By focusing on the SOEs relocation, we can understand some of the impacts
of the recent land policy reforms.
CHAPTER 4
EMPIRICAL STUDY OF THE INSTITUTIONAL IMPACTS OF THE
LAND CONVEYANCE REFORM
To explore the deindustrialization process in Beijing and the institutional impact of
the LCR, I begin by studying the socioeconomic development in Beijing, to provide
the context of LCR. For the institutional impact part, I compare the old and the new
land-development-control mechanism and analyze their impacts on how various
agencies work together during the land-development decision-making process.
4.1 Deindustrialization in Beijing
As the capital of the country and one of China's biggest cities (currently over 15
million population), Beijing has a long history of over 2000 years. It became the
capital of China in 1949, when China was established. Before the open door policy in
1978, Beijing was the model city of a socialist planned economy-strong planning
control has been the prominent feature of its urban land use (Deng, 2003). Since then,
Beijing has been initiating various reforms on land markets, housing markets, and
land regulations. In addition, Beijing had a large amount of industrial land, especially
in the inner city, with most industries being relocated in the recent decade.
4.1.1 Beijing Socioeconomic Development
As of 2007, the total land area in Beijing is 16,410 square kilometers (km2). Beijing
municipal government governs 18 districts and counties and has over 15 million
population (Table 4-1; Figure 4-1). From the old city, inner city, outskirts, to suburbs,
the various "ring roads" are set up every two kilometers as the spatial framework of
the urban development. The 2nd Ring Road defines the old city area and the latest
ring road is the 6th Ring Road which was built to connect various suburbs. Among
the 18 districts: four districts are designated as old city area, which is the area within
the 2nd Ring Road: Xi Cheng, Dong Cheng, Chong Wen, and Xuan Wu; four districts are
designated as inner city area7: Chao Yang, Feng Tai, Shijing Shan, and Hai Dian; and
the other ten districts are suburbs: Da Xing, Tong Zhou, Shun Yi, Men Tou Gou, Chang
Ping Fang Shan, Ping Gu, Huai Rou, Mi Yun, and Yan Qing.
Table 4-1: Demographics by Districts of Beijing in 2005
Population
(in 1,000 persons) Land Area (sq.km*)
Population Density
(persons/sqkm)
Dongcheng 612 25.4 24,11
Xicheng 757 31.6 23,94
Chongwen 358 16.5 21,67
Xuanwu 530 18.9 28,13
Chaoyang 1711 455.1 4,74
Fengtai 974 305.8 3,18
Shijingchan 350 84.3 4,15
Haidian 1918 431.0 4,45
Mentougou 238 1450.7 16
Fangshan 784 1989.5 39
Tongzhou 629 906.3 69
Shunyi 559 1019.8 54
Changping 4.2 1343.5 35
Daxing 5.6 1036.3 54
Pinggu 4.5 950.1 44
Huairou 3.3 2122.6 14
Miyun 4.2 2229.4 19
Yanqing 2.6 1993.7 13
Source: Beijing Statistics Year Book, 2005
Note: Sq.km. = square kilometers.
7 The boundary of the inner-city, named Central City in Beijing, kept changing during time due to the spatial
development of the city. In the latest version of the Beijing Master Plan, it roughly refers to these four districts and the
old city area.
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Figure 4-1: District Locations in Beijing
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Like many other Chinese cities, Beijing has been experiencing rapid economic growth
as well as urban development. In the past decade, the gross domestic product (GDP)
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of Beijing has increased from 139.5 billion yuan 8 in 1995 to 475.9 billion yuan in 2005.
The annual GDP growth rate is more than 10% and overpasses that of China's
(Figure 4-2). The GDP per capita increased from 10,261 yuan in 1994 to 31,613 in
2003, while the household disposable income increased from 4,731 yuan in 1994 to
13,882 yuan in 2003 (Figure 4-3). One major component of this economic growth
was the real estate development, which was driven by the land market and land
policies.
Figure 4-2: GDP Volume and Growth Rate in Beijing, 1995-2005
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Yuan is the name of the Chinese currency, also called RMB. I yuan equals 7.8 U.S. dollar in January, 2007.
Figure 4-3: GDP per capita and Household Disposable Income in Beijing, 1994-2003
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4.1.2 Deindustrialization Process
Beijing as the capital city of China also plays an important role in its industrial
development due to the fact that Socialist China emphasized the importance of
production during its early period. First, I discuss the historical industrial pattern and
then, the current deindustrialization process.
4.1.2.1 Industrial History
The history of major industrial development in Beijing began in the early 1950s.
During the 1949 to 1959 period, several industry sectors were developed in various
locations of the city: the cotton textile cluster in the east suburb, the electronics
cluster in the north-east suburb, the mechanical, chemical, and metallurgy cluster in
U GDP per capita (Yuan) U Household Disposable Income (Yuan)
IN GDP per capita (Yuan) 0 Household Disposable Income 
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the south east. Most of these industries were located in the outskirts or suburbs at
that time when the city was mainly within the old town area, which is defined by the
2nd Ring Road now. Those industries provided many employment opportunities as
well as production for the newly established country.
From the 1960s to 1970s, after nearly two decades of industrial development, on the
one hand, the following major industries of the city became the essential ones:
automobile, iron and steel, petroleum and chemical, construction materials,
mechanical, and electricity. On the other hand, because the city had been sprawling
over time, some of the industries that were originally located on the outskirts began
to be included in the urban area. Problems like congestion, pollution, and land-use
compatibility began to occur.
4.1.2.2 Relocation Policy
The relocation of factories in Beijing started from 1985, due to the fact that many of
the inner-city industries produced considerable pollution and created many
environmental problems for the communities. Since then, the Beijing municipal
government initiated three stages of relocation and has relocated more than 200
projects from the inner-city area (IRN, BEC, 2000) (Table 4-2). The first stage went
from 1985 to 1994: 65 projects were relocated; total land converted was 0.316 square
kilometer (sq. km). During this period, no specific regulations were put forward to
intervene in the industry relocation. Most relocation projects were small-scale and
poorly funded. However, it did help to decrease the inner-city industry pollution.
Table 4-2: Industry Relocation Policy and Stage in Beijing (1985-2005)
Stage Relocated Land Land Converted Regulations
Projects Converted per year (10,000
(10,000 sq. sq. m)
m)
1985- 1994 65 31.6 3.2
1995- 05.1999 59 171.8 34.4 Implementation Method of
Relocating Industries of Pollution or
Annoying Residents in Beijing (1995)
06.1999- 134* 613* 102.2* Implementation Method of
2005* Relocating Pollution Industries and
Industry Restructuring (06.1999)
Relocation Scenario of Industry
Relocation within the 4 h Ring Road
(08.2000)
Note: *: No data are available after 2000; data used for this period are from the proposal in
1999 by the Beijing Economic Committee.
Source: "Industry Relocation Newsletter", Beijing Economic Committee, Beijing
Development and Reform Committee, 2000
From 1995, the second stage relocated 59 projects and converted 1,718 sq. km.
industrial land. The average land area converted per year for the second stage (0.34 sq.
km.) was even bigger than the total land area converted from 1985 to 1994. It was
due to the adoption of the "Implementation Method of Relocating Industries of
Pollution or Annoying Residents in Beijing" (1995), which required the industries in
inner-city with heavy pollution, which were producing a strong negative externality to
the surrounding communities and residents had to be relocated.
It was not until June 1999, when the "Implementation Method of Relocation
Pollution Industries and Industry Restructuring" (06.1999) was adopted, that the
large-scale industry relocation began to take place in Beijing. There are no data on
how many factories were relocated and how much industrial land was converted since
1999, but the data for the period of January to August, 2000 could give us a sense:
during that 8-month period, 24 relocation projects were approved by the Beijing
Economic Committee (BEC), 14 relocation projects were approved jointly by BEC,
Beijing Planning Committee (BPC), Beijing Urban Planning Committee (BUPC), and
Beijing City Infrastructure Management Committee (BCIMC). The total land
converted during this period was 0.46 sq. km. The "Adjustment Plan for Industrial
Location in Beijing" (12.1999) by the BEC proposed that 134 projects were to be
relocated during the 10th Five-Year period (from 2000- 2005), totaling 6.13 sq. km of
land area converted. However, I assume the real number in Beijing is larger than
shown in 1999. One important reason is that after Beijing's successful bid for the
2008 Olympic Games in 2001, both the central and municipal government initiated
larger-scale industry relocation in Beijing in order to achieve a "Green Olympics" for
2008. I have not been able to get precise data to verify this assumption.
4.1.2.3 Industrial Land Conversion
During the various stages of the deindustrialization process in Beijing, lots of
industrial land was converted into residential or commercial uses. There are no data
available to show the spatial and numeric change of industry land conversion in the
inner-city area; however, the following information could indicate the spatial pattern
of industry locations in Beijing over the time.
In 1995, before the large-scale relocation took place, there was 264 sq. km of
industrial land in metropolitan Beijing, of which 115 sq. km was located in the central
city area and 149 sq. km in the suburbs (Table 4-3). Obviously, a greater percentage
of the industrial land was in the central city area compared to its land area, which is
much smaller than the suburbs. In addition, the central city area had more enterprises
and higher industrial output compared to the suburbs. Within the central city area,
specifically, Chao Yang, Hai Dian, and Shijing Shan, are three districts that have a
strong industrial base as well as more industrial land.
In 1999, there was 28.3 sq. km. industrial or industrial-enterprise land within the 4th
Ring Road, which was 8.7% of the total land area within the 4th Ring Road (Table 4-
4). Of that, nearly half (13.7 sq. km) was between the 3rd Ring Road and the 4th Ring
Road. From the "Adjustment Plan for Industrial Location in Beijing" (12.1999), there
was more than 8 sq. km. industrial land converted within the 4th Ring Road from
1999 to 2003.
In 2003, after the large-scale industry relocation process of 1999, there were only four
Table 4-3: Industrial Enterprises Location in Beijing (1995)
Number of Percentage of Industrial Output in Percentage of Industrial Land Area Percentage of
District Enterprises Beijing (%) 1995 (10 million Yuan*) Beijing (%) (10 thousand sq.meter) Beijing (%)
Dong Cheng 379 3.5 26.2 2 421 1.6
Xi Cheng 540 5.0 28.9 2.3 878 3.3
Central Chong Wen 338 3.2 21.0 1.6 302 1.1
City Area Xuan Wu 314 2.9 24.3 1.9 551 2.0
of Chao Yang 1962 18.3 330.9 25.8 3856 14.5
Beijing** Feng Tai 821 7.7 76.4 6 1572 5.9
Shi Jing Shan 256 2.4 151.4 11.8 2249 8.5
Hai Dian 1306 12.2 219.9 17.2 1709 6.5
Total: Central
City 5916 55.2 879.0 68.6 11538 43.4
Meng Tou Gou 306 2.9 14.2 1.1 2095 7.9
Fang Shan 544 5.2 159.1 12.4 4823 18.2
Chang Ping 716 6.7 34.8 2.7 1751 6.6
Non- Shun Yi 647 6.0 50.5 3.9 1785 6.7
Central Tong Zhou 517 4.8 35.3 2.8 1233 4.7
City Area Da Xing 809 7.6 28.9 2.3 1110 4.2
of Beijing Ping Gu 351 3.3 24.5 1.9 470 1.8
Huai Rou 336 2.2 28.3 2.2 594 2.2
Mi Yun 294 2.7 21.1 1.6 660 2.5
Yan Qing 276 2.6 6.6 0.5 397 1.6
Total: Non-
Central City 4796 44.8 403.3 31.4 14918 56.6
Total 10712 100 1282.3 100 26456 100
Note:
1. * 1 Yuan = 8.23 U.S. Dollars
2. ** Central city area refers to area defined by Beijing Master Plan (2004)
Source: Beijing Industry Adjustment Plan, Beijing Economic Committee, December 6, 1999
Table 4-4: Spatial Pattern and Land Resource of Industrial Enterprises within the 4th Ring Road in Beijing, May, 1999
Enterprises Within 2"d Ring Road 2nd__ 3 rd Ring Road 3'd4 t Ring Road Within 4th Ring Road Percentage of Area
Number Land Number Land Number Land Number Land Area within the 4th Ring
of Firms Area of Firms Area of Firms Area of Firms (sq.m) Road (%)
(sq.m) (sq.m) (sq.m) 
___
1 Municipal 96 1329745 93 4544352 108 8130087 297 14004184 4.32
Industrial
Enterprises
2 Municipal 24 1371034 67 1492772 83 2460978 174 5324784 1.64
Non-
Industrial
Enterprises
3 District 100 590681 76 496773 74 618421 250 1705875 0.53
E n terp rise s 2 .2 5
4 National or 12 3761306 25 1019281 25 2521075 62 7301662 2.25
Military
Enterprises
Total 232 7052766 261 7553178 290 13730561 783 28336505 8.74
Note:
1. Municipal Industrial Enterprises and District Enterprises refer to those whose land area is above 1000 sq. meter.
2. National or Military Enterprises refer to those owned by Central government or Military Department whose land area is above 1000 sq.
meter.
3. 121 former municipal industrial enterprises were converted to District Enterprises, total land area of which is 1.2 million sq. meter.
Source:
Beijing Industry Adjustment Plan, Beijing Economic Committee, December 6, 1999
major industry clusters left in the central city area of Beijing9: Beijing Capital Iron and
Steel Group in the west; Beijing Electronic Group in the north east; Beijing Chemical
Plant Group in the east; and Beijing Coke Plant in the south east. (Figure 4-4) Three
of them with the exception of the Beijing Electronic Group were proposed to be
relocated in the next five to ten years in the latest Beijing Master Plan. (Figure 4-5).
Note that the industries remaining in Beijing are proposed by 2020 to be clustered
into just a few groups, whereas in 2003, they are scattered throughout the city.
4.2 Institutional Impact
The land-development-control mechanism (LDCM) has become a major institutional
and financial tool for local government to get both political support and financial
revenues. The LDCM in China is a discretion-based mechanism instead of regulation-
based mechanism due to the context of transition period in China. Since the open-
door policy and reform, Gradualism was taken as the reform approach, which led to
the current transition period. In this context, "ambiguity" is the characteristic of the
LDCM-the ambiguous land property rights, the ambiguous land conveyance
method, the ambiguous land use planning process, and the ambiguous decision-
making process of industry relocation. Some scholars (Oi, 2001, Zhu, 2005) argue
that ambiguity provides flexibility for the local governments and is essential in the
transition period. However, the recent Land Conveyance Reform (05, 2002) and the
9 Interview with planners from Beijing Planning Institute in June, 2006.
Figure 4-5: Proposed Industrial Land Location in Beijing (2020)
Source: Beijing Master Plan (2004- 2020)
Figure 4-4: Existing Industrial Land Location in Beijing (2003)
Source: Beijing Master Plan (2004- 2020)
newly approved "China Property Law" (03, 2007) have been put forward to bring a
more well-defined land-conveyance market.
Do these changes indicate the ending of China's transition period? My answer is:
no-I argue that the better-defined land conveyance market did not lead to the
fundamental change in the LDCM, which is supposed to be closely linked with the
land conveyance in the context of the Socialist country. However, the better-defined
land-conveyance market did bring an institutional shift in the land redevelopment
process and pushed the transition period towards a more government- controlled
environment with more institutional negotiations among various agencies and
ministries.
The LCR was adopted through the Decree 11 of the Ministry Land Resource (MLR)
in May, 2002. The decree regulates that the LUR of for-profit land usesO has to be
transferred through land auction, instead of through the negotiation approach, which
was allowed before. August 31, 2004 was used as the deadline of transferring LURs
through negotiation in Beijing. Specifically, three types of auctions are allowed in the
new approach: sealed bid auction (bao biao), open bid auction (pal maz), and initial
public offering (guapai). For the sealed bid auction: the municipal or town
government needs to announce the bidding information in advance and invite
relevant developers and legal entities to the process. The evaluation can be based on
other factors besides land price. For the open bid auction: the municipal or town
government needs to announce the auction information and whoever offers the
highest price get the bid. For the initial public offering: former land users should
announce the information of the site as well as the deadline of price offerings in the
Beijing Land Reserve and Management Center (BLRMC). The BLRMC needs to
update the information once they get new price offerings from developers, and they
will issue the LUR to the one who gets the offer before the deadline. All these three
methods differ from the previous auction approach, which decided the land price
through the negotiation between developers and SOEs.
4.2.1 Transition of the Land-Development-Control Mechanism
There are two central elements in the LDCM during the land-redevelopment process
in China: the Detailed Development Control Plan (DDCP) and the "one report and
two permits" (ORATP) system. The DDCP is the legal process for the local
government to regulate and control the outcome of the development, using land-use
planning and land-use regulations as means. It usually includes the intervention on
allowable land uses, Floor Area Ratio (FAR), building height, building set-back
distances, building density, major road exits, required public facilities and other
specific elements". The ORATP is the process for the local urban planning authority
to review land-use applications from individual land users. "One report" refers to the
10 For-profit land uses refers to the specific uses like retail, commercial, residential, entertainment, and etc. (Decree i1,
2002)
" DDCP is similar to the Zoning Regulations in the United States.
Site Selection Recommendation Report (SSRR); "two permits" refer to the Land-Use
Planning Permit (LUPP) and the Building Construction Permit (BCP).
4.2.1.1 Before LCR-Under Negotiation Approach
Before the LCR, most of the land conveyance was conducted through negotiation.
The highest percentage was conducted through negotiation in the cases of SOE land
conveyance. I review the procedure of LDCM before the LCR, using negotiation
approach as land-conveyance method.
Most SOEs in Beijing acquired their land through the earlier administrative-
allocation-land was given to them from the government free of charge. Technically,
administratively allocated land is not marketable unless special permission is granted
by governments at or above the county level. In addition, SOEs have to pay a certain
amount of land premium to the government before they have the right to dispose of
land (Xu, 2001). In reality, many SOEs just sold the LURs to the developers with or
without approval from the government. Therefore, for those LURs that were
transferred without government approval, they will go through the black market,
which is an illegal underground land market. These illegal LUR transfers are
widespread in Chinese cities (Wang and Li, 1997; Sun and Tang, 1997; Dowall, 1993;
Ng and Xu, 1996; Zhang and Wu, 1994; Bao, 1997, Yeh and Wu, 2005). For the
LURs transfers, which get approved by the municipal government, they need to go
through the conveyance procedure and LDCM, which is reviewed below (Figure 4-6).
During the industrial land-conversion process, the SOE who is the former land user
will either have an intention to relocate or be ordered to relocate by the local
government due to the environmental reasons (Implementation Method of Relocation
Pollution Industries and Industy Restructuring, 1999). The SOE will find a developer or
several developers who potentially have an interest in buying the land. After their
discussions of the land price and other compensation issues, the SOE will select one
developer who could provide the best offer. The SOE then needs to apply for
approval of the relocation project from the Beijing Municipal Commission of
Development and Reform (BMCDR). The application needs to provide the plan of
relocation, industry restructuring plan, as well as the way to compensate the staff.
After the project is approved by the BMCDR, the SOE as the land user needs to go
to the BUPC to get the SSRR, which is usually issued together with the Planning
Design Requirement (PDR). In reality, the developer usually goes to the BUPC
instead, because SSRR and PDR are supposed to review the proposed use and
relevant control requirements of the site, which are directly associated with the
economic benefits of the developer. Once the SSRR and PDR are issued, the
developer will apply for the LUPP to the BUPC. The LUPP provides detailed
regulations on what land uses are allowed for future development on the site and
Figure 4-6: Pre-LCR Land-Development Control Mechanism in Beijing- Negotiation Approach
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other guidelines like site boundary, FAR, building height and etc. During the process,
the DDCP needs to be conducted by the Beijing Urban Planning Institute (BUPI) if
the site did not have one before. The DDCP is supposed to reflect the government's
intervention on the site for the purpose of public interests. However, the BUPI is
hired by the developer to conduct the DDCP for the site; BUPI needs to consider
both the SSRR from BUPC as well as the benefit of the developer. After the LUPP is
issued, the developer could then go to the Beijing Land Management Bureau (BLMB)
to apply for the Land Use Permit (LUP) after they pay the land conveyance fees. It is
not until the developer get the LUP from BLMB that it has the right to develop the
land in ways that are allowed by LUPP. The developer will then hire architecture
consultants to conduct the architecture design and construction design for the site,
meanwhile contacting various agencies to review the potential impacts of the project,
in terms of environmental, traffic, infrastructure, and historic preservation. The
architects need to modify the design and planning to accommodate the comments
from these agencies. The developer finally needs to collect evaluation memos from
relevant agencies before they turn back to the BUPC with the design to apply for the
BCP. The developer could finally begin the construction work after they get the BCP.
4.2.1.2 After LCR-Under Auction Approach
In the new approach, the SOE that intends to relocate needs to apply to the BMCDR
and the Beijing Economic Committee (BEC). Both BMCDR and BEC review the
relocation application and check with the Implementation Method of Relocation Pollution
Industries and Industy Restructuring, (1999), Beijing Master Plan (2004), and the annual
land-supply plan (Figure 4-7). Once the application is approved, the application is
transferred to the Beijing Land Reserve and Management Center (BLRMC), which is
a newly established agency within the BLMB in 2001, especially for the land-
conveyance market after LCR. The BLRMC discusses with the SOE and the Beijing
Industrial Technology Development Center (BITDC) to decide which of the two
ways the SOE will follow:
One is to transfer the LUR back to the local government, specifically, the BLRMC. In
this case, the land is reserved by the local government and put into conveyance
market when necessary; the other way is to transfer the LUR to another real estate
developer through the land auction.
If the SOE decides to transfer the LUR to the local government as part of the
government reserved land, compensation to the SOE is negotiated between the SOE
and BLRMC. If land conveyance is the selectedapproach, the BLRMC at first
organizes the initial land development (ILDT). ILDT is the legal process for local
government to claim the LUR from land users and make various preparations for the
land to be ready for auction, including providing infrastructure, organizing resident
relocation, collecting legal documents from various agencies, and conducting DDCP
for the site (Decree 540, BLMB). BLRMC has the legal authority to do the ILD;
however, it does not have the capacity in terms of the financial and human resources.
Figure 4-7: Post-LCR Land-Development Control Mechanism- Auction Approach
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Auction Procedure
Therefore, an initial land developer (ILDP) is chosen by the BLRMC through a
bidding process.
The ILDP then provides various site services, including having the BUPI conduct the
DDCP for the site, if it was not done before. The ILDP also contacts the BUPC and
relevant agencies in order to find the ideal land uses and development pattern. The
SSRR is issued if relevant agencies agree with the proposed scenario or do not
disagree with the existing DDCP. At this stage, the LUR of the SOE is returned to
the municipal government. Before the land is put into the auction market, the land
price needs to be determined for the auction. The BLMB evaluates the cost of the
project. The Land Price Evaluation Committee (LPEC) which consists of BLRMC
and BMCDR announces the land price for the auction. The BLRMC finally organizes
the auction, using one of the three methods: sealed bid auction (fhao biao), open bid
auction (pai maz), and initial public offering (guapaz).
It is not until the land auction that the new land user-the real estate developer-is
selected as the legal entity to develop the industrial site and convert it to other uses
that are allowed by DDCP. The new land user needs to go to the BLMB to pay the
land premium and sign the LUR contract. The new land user also needs to go to
BUPC to get the LUPP and BCP after the DDCP is confirmed and construction
drawings are approved.
4.2.2 Institutional Shift of the ORTP
The industrial land-redevelopment process is a process of revenue generation and
revenue distribution for the local municipal government. As stated above, the LCR
from the negotiation approach of selling the LURs to the auction approach has
changed the way that various government agencies as well as former and new land
users participate in the land-conversion process. This change has caused an
institutional shift for one of the central elements of LDCM: ORTP, from the former
"developer-coordinated process" to the current "BLRMC-coordinated process."
ORTP as the formal land-use review procedure for all legal land redevelopment in an
urban area affects the jurisdiction of each agency who participates in the decision-
making process. More importantly, the ORTP process also provides the possibility
for the informal negotiations, which sometimes greatly shape the land-use decisions,
both before and after LCR. In this context, "negotiation" is reflected by different
types between different agencies, among which land conveyance through
"cnegotiation" just refers to the negotiation between developer and government in
terms of the land price. One of the other key negotiations besides the land price
negotiation is the negotiation on the DDCP of the site, specifically, on the future land
use and the FAR of the new development. These two parameters decide what kind of
development is allowable and how much floor area could be built-they are directly
related with how much revenue the real estate developer can get from the new
development on the site.
In the negotiation approach before the LCR, the BUPC and BUPI played important
roles deciding the DDCP of the site, which strongly affected by the developer. When
the developer initially negotiates with the SOE about the relocation and
compensation, the developer might know what they want to do on the site. However,
they do not know what they will be allowed to do if the DDCP of the site was not
conducted before. Therefore, having a profitable DDCP for the site is what they care
about most. It thus becomes the driver for them to take the lead in applying for the
SSSRR, PDR, and LUPP from the BUPC, while that is supposed to be done by the
SOE who was the former land user. The developer usually hires the BUPI to conduct
the DDCP for the site and uses that to negotiate with the BUPC. The BUPI is a
unique entity in Beijing's transition period. In Chinese cities, a planning institute is
not a purely private-for-profit planning organization, although making profits is one
of their major tasks. Most planning institutes used to belong to the municipal
planning authority, which is the government agency in charge of the physical planning
of the city. Since the reform in China, most of the planning institutes began to split
from the planning authority, and not be directly controlled by the government.
However, until now (2007), only a very limited number of them have restructured the
management and become private for-profit planning firms, which is not the case in
Beijing. When the BUPI conducts the DDCP for the site, they need to consider both
the "public interests" and the "client interests", which in many cases conflict. The
BUPC thus is essential in proposing and approving the allowable development
outcome of the site. The decision usually goes back-and-forth for many rounds
among the BUPC, the developer, and the BUPI, until it is finally decided.
For the auction approach after the LCR, the DDCP has to be conducted before the
land is put onto the auction market and transferred to the new land user, because the
DDCP is one important factor of the auction price. Therefore, the real estate
developers, whose profits are directly related with the DDCP, have no opportunities
to intervene in the DDCP process as they did in the old system. They could not
participate in the LDCM process until they get the land from the auction and then go
to the BUPC for the LUPP and BCP. However, the land-development control
parameters were decided by the BUPC and BUPI in the form of the SSRR and PDR
before the auction. The process is coordinated by the BLRMC instead of the real
estate developer.
The BLRMC belongs to the BLMB and was established in 2001 for the municipal
government to improve its control of the land market in Beijing. All the LUR
auctions have to be organized by the BLRMC. This institutional setting greatly
enhanced the importance of the BLMB in the LDCM, while compared to pre-LCR
period, the BUPC plays major roles. The BLMB belongs to the Ministry of Land
Resources (MLR), while the BUPC belongs to the Ministry of Construction (MC)
(Figure 4-8). Before the LCR, the MLR focused on the land conversion from rural
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land to urban land; the MC was in charge of the urban land redevelopment, including
DDCP and ORTP. The LCR also implies the shift of the scope of MLR from the
pervious rural land conversion to urban land conversion-the BLMB thus has major
institutional power over urban land conversion.
The institutional shift, however, cannot be implemented without the relevant
mechanisms designed to intervene in the ORTP and DDCP process. In the auction
approach, the ILDT is such a mechanism, which ensures the legitimate involvement
and intervention of the BLMB. During the ILDT process, the government,
specifically the BLRMC, is responsible for claiming the LUR from the SOE,
coordinating among related agencies about the DDCP for the site, and relocation of
the residents. This work used to be done by real-estate developers after they negotiate
with the developer and agree on getting the LUR from the SOE. After the LCR, this
work was institutionalized by the local government, and the BLMB was designated as
the responsible agency.
4.2.3 DDCP and DDCP Amendment
The LCR brought changes to the institutional settings of the LDCM and the ORTP
during the industrial land redevelopment process in Beijing. These changes from the
"developer-coordinated process" to the "BLRMC-coordinated process" increase the
government control over the industrial land-redevelopment process. They greatly
limit the former "development-oriented DDCP", which takes financing of the
redevelopment and developer benefits as the major considerations for proposing the
DDCP. Meanwhile, they potentially empower the local governments and planning
authorities to consider bring more social, ecological, and environmental
considerations than before when they propose the DDCP. However, the LCR and
changes in LDCM did not lead to any fundamental changes to the DDCP proposal
and amendment process itself. The process is still discretionary and arbitrary.
In 1999, in order to implement the Beijing Master Plan (1992-2010), the BUPC
initiated a large-scale DDCP for downtown Beijing, which regulated the type of land
uses allowable for the 3 2 4 -sq. km. area. Since then, for the land conversion on a site
that has the existing DDCP already conducted, a DDCP Amendment application
needs to be issued if the developer or the local government thought the former
DDCP does not reflect the new changes happening on or around the site and thus
need updated considerations and review of other possibilities of the redevelopment.
The new Beijing Master Plan (2004-2020) was approved by the State Council in 2004,
following another larger-scale DDCP that was conducted by the BUPC and BUPI
since 2006. The DDCP Amendment is the major form of land-use planning in the
built area of Beijing, like many other big cities in the United States.12
12 DDCP Amendment, named "rezoning" in the Uniteed States., occupies the majority of the land-use planning work of
the New York City Department of City Planning.
The DDCP Amendment is a formal process that regulates the involvement of
specific agencies. It did not change after the LCR (Figure 4-9). A DDCP Amendment
applicant needs to initiate an application and submit it to the BMCDR. Once
approved, the BUPC and BUPI need to review the existing DDCP as well as the
application and make a text amendment and a map amendment. The amendments
together with the environment impact assessment (EIA) and traffic impact
assessment (TIA) are passed onto the Detail Planning Division at BUPC. The Detail
Planning Division either approves or rejects the amendment. The approved
amendment will be reviewed by the cross-agency Joint Review Committee, consisting
of seven relevant agencies: infrastructure, parks, historic preservation, environment
protection, transportation, urban planning, and planning institute.
The Joint Review Committee meets to go through the application and the
amendment and decides whether or not the amendment should be approved. The
approved amendment then goes to the municipal government, the Detail Planning
Division of the BUPC, and, finally, it is made into a formalized DDCP by the Land
Use Division of BUPC.
The decisions of DDCP Amendment on development parameters like land uses,
FAR, and building height are within the technical jurisdiction of the BUPC, because it
is the city planning agency that is in charge of the physical planning of the city.
However, those decisions are far more than just the technical ones-they influence
Figure 4-9: DDCP Amendment Procedure in Beijing
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the social and political landscape of the communities; thus, ideally they need
involvement of various groups in the municipal government, developers, and
residents. Despite the impacts the LCR brought to the LDCM and ORTP, the
DDCP Amendment procedure did not change-it is still a highly BUPC-controlled
discretionary process, although it has interactions with various city agencies. In
addition, there are many problems with the process that caused much informal
negotiation during the process: the voting system is not specified; the cross-agency
DDCP review system is not well regulated, etc. Furthermore, the DDCP Amendment
procedure does not provide for the legal enforcement of the decisions and regulation
of the process. Therefore, the DDCP Amendment is dejure a land-use decision-
making process coordinated by the BUPC with regulated involvement from various
groups, while it is defacto an arbitrary process, which is highly discretionary and
affected by other city agencies and various informal factors.
Because of these features of the DDCP Amendment procedure in Beijing, the LCR
did not lead to the procedural improvement of it, while changing from the former
"bottom-up application" to the "institutional negotiation." Before the LCR, the
DDCP Amendment applicant who has to initiate the amendment process was in
most cases the developer, who wants to get the LUR from the SOE. While the
application is reviewed by the BUPC and BUPI, the developer sometimes reached the
higher-level government officials through their personal connections. In some cases,
the higher-level officials indicated to the BUPC certain kinds of "requests" for the
DDCP Amendment.13 The process therefore consisted of the formal "bottom-up"
applications from developers and the informal "top-down" indications from higher-
level officials. After the LCR, developers do not become the major type of applicants
for the DDCP Amendment because they are not involved in the LDCM process until
they win the land auction, while the DDCP Amendments are usually done before that,
if necessary. Therefore, the BUPC and BUPI got far fewer DDCP Amendment
applications from developers after the LCR.14 The applicants have been shifting from
developers to the city agencies, including the BUPC or BUPI, BLRMC, or various
ministry bureaus that govern the former land-user SOE, depending in which sector it
is categorized. The motivation for these agencies to initiate the DDCP Amendment
for the industrial land varies among various agencies, as well as differs from that of
developers. Those motivations and the type of informal and formal negotiation
process among the agencies are extremely important for deciding the future
development scenario of the site; however, it is out of the scope of this study and
thus is not discussed here.
4.2.4 Transition of Land-Supply Mechanism
The Land Market Reform in the late 1980s, on the one hand, has successfully made
urban land into a commercial commodity and led to a rapidly growing real estate
market in Beijing and other Chinese cities. On the other hand, the real estate
13 The former Mayor of Beijing (1983-1992), Chen Xi-Tong was arrested due to the corruption, among which many
were related with land-development projects in Beijing.
14 Interview with planners from the BUPI in June, 2006.
development has resulted in an increasing demand for land. In 2005, the total amount
of real estate investment reached RMB 152.5 billion in Beijing and had an average
annual growth rate of 40% in the past 20 years (Sun, 2005). Urban industrial land as
the scarce resource in Beijing became the major factor for real estate development
and the increasing housing price. It thus led to the fact that many real estate
developers bought more land in advance at a low price through negotiating with
SOEs and reserved that land for many years until the real estate market became far
more active. Because small-scale developers do not have the financial capacity to
reserve much land, the supply of the urban land could be monopolized by several
major large-scale real estate developers if the government does not intervene in this
market. The monopolization of the land supply in the markets that have a huge
demand augmented the real estate price.
The LCR regulated the land-supply mechanism by establishing the government-led
land-reservation market. Once the SOE plans to relocate from downtown to other
regions, the municipal government, specifically, the BLRMC, at first negotiates with
the SOE about whether the SOE wants to sell the LUR through a land auction, or
sell the LUR to the BLRMC. In the latter case, the BLRMC negotiates with t he SOE
about the land price, and then transfers that land into government-reserved land.
Such land goes to the municipal land-reservation bank and is put into the land-
auction market by the government through the annual land-supply plan (Table 4-5).
Table 4-5: Land Supply Plan of Beijing, 2006 (hectare)
Total amount of land to Newly expanded Amount of land of for-
be supplied land profit development
Dongcheng 50 0 30
Xicheng 50 0 30
Chongwen 65 0 40
Xuanwu 70 0 30
Chaoyang 490 250 280
Haidian 330 180 180
Fengtai 260 110 150
Shijingchan 85 30 60
Mentougou 50 20 20
Fangshan 200 110 100
Tongzhou 390 215 200
Shunyi 360 180 180
Changping 200 110 110
Daxing 380 200 180
Pinggu 80 40 40
Huairou 100 50 60
Miyun 80 40 40
Yanqing 40 15 20
Total 3500 1700 1800
Source: Decree 174, Beijing Land Management Bureau, 2006
These impacts on the institutional settings of land conversion process are crucial to
the land redevelopment in downtown areas in many cities. It also plays important
roles shaping the social outcome of some danwei communities' redevelopment.
CHAPTER 5
THE SOCIAL IMPACTS-CASE STUDY OF BEIJING COTTON
TEXTILE FACTORY
The large-scale deindustrialization and the LCR created many social impacts. I focus
on the condition of working staff of SOEs. I examine these laborers with the context
of the privatization of SOEs in China since the 1990s, which led to the abolishment
of the socialist social welfare and social-service mechanism: danwei system. Therefore,
the working class has been facing dual challenges simultaneously: the decrease of their
access to the social service and social welfare as well as the burden to be relocated
from subsidized housing in the downtown area to commodity housing in the suburbs.
The challenges do not fit in with China's gradual reform approach and have caused
many protests and criticism from below. I argue that the key reason for the dual
challenges is China's unique situation-the deindustrialization process goes hand-in-
hand with privatization of SOEs since the mid 1990s. My research shows that the
LCR does not solve the problem; instead, it just slows down the occurrence of the
problems. Finally, I study the redevelopment of Beijing Cotton Textile Factory (ing
Mian 5) danwei community as the only example in Beijing to still keep a large number
of low-income staff in the downtown area. If explore reasons for that decision in
order to compare with previous findings.
5.1 Social Transition from Danwei Community to Market Community
China has won praise for its economic development since 1978, particularly in the
recent decade, when it plays more important roles in the regional economics, after the
Southeast Asia Financial Crisis. However, it also received much criticism for its
emerging social and environmental problems, especially for marginalization of the
low-income people during the transition period. Since the beginning of the
communist rule, gradualism was used as the approach and principal to guide the
reform in order to ensure political and social stability. This approach was also used
for the reforms to China's biggest production sector-SOEs, since they hired the
majority of employees before the reform. The privatization of SOEs has changed the
way the State provides social welfare and social service to the public. The former
socialist welfare mechanism-danwei system was gradually abolished. This transition
has been fundamentally reshaping the social landscape in most Chinese cities.
However, my research links this social transition with the other essential issue-
deindustrialization as the spatial relocation process of SOEs. The impacts on the low-
income SOE staff do not come from either of these two issues; instead, they come
from both of them, which happened simultaneously in the past decade.
5.1.1 Privatization of SOEs
In Maoist China, the SOE was intended to be not merely an organization for
production but a danwei, an almost self-sufficient economic and social community that
15 Jing Mian is the Chinese name of Beijing Cotton Textile Factory.
provided most of the social welfare and social service its members needed (Lee, 2000).
The existence of the danwei fitted in with the socialist political ideology after 1949-
the state has the social obligations to ensure employment opportunities to a large
number of people, while guaranteeing basic services for these workers through
egalitarian distribution of resources, even at the cost of tight political control limiting
the freedom of choice for the individual. Danwei provides social welfare that
constituted core parts of the state sector under socialism-education, health care,
retirement benefits, unemployment insurance, and pensions. Danwei communities,
where most of the SOE staff lives are usually planned together with hospitals, schools,
community centers, and entertainment and cultural facilities that are owned and
managed by the SOEs. People call a danwei community a "small society," because it
usually includes various services needed for daily life, which are spatially clustered.
Before the reform, SOE labor force constituted a rather privileged group with better
job security, wages, and welfare benefits than non-SOE workers (Lee, 2000).
However, the mechanism of socialist danwei began to conflict with the general
economic growth goal set up by China's reform in 1979. SOEs failed to make profits
for the state, while sharing the strong burden of providing social services to a large
number of surplus working staff. Especially since the 1990s, a large number of SOEs
began to lose money for the state. By 1996, more than one-third were operating at a
deficit, while others that were listed as profit makers in accounting ledgers actually
were incurring losses. These two categories accounted for 63% of all SOEs (Yeh
1998, Lee 2000). Take Beijing as an example, even in 2004, after many years' SOE
reform, there was still 37% SOEs that were loss-making enterprises (Table 5-1).
These SOE problems greatly affected China's economic growth and thus become the
driver of SOE reform in the 1990s, which later led to large-scale SOE privatization
and deindustrialization.
Table 5-1: Number of Loss-Making SOEs in Beijing, 2004
Total Number Loss-making Percentage of Loss-
of Enterprises Enterprises making Enterprises
Of Total: Central-government SOE 344 124 36.0%
Local-government SOE 987 370 37.5%
Of Total: Light Industry 537 234 43.6%
Heavy Industry 794 260 32.7%
Large Enterprises 34 4 11.8%
Of Total: Medium Enterprises 193 32 16.6%
Small Enpterprises 1,104 458 41.5%
Total 1,331 494 37.1%
Source: Beijing Statistical Yearbook 2005
The SOE reform was initiated by the central government and focused on economic
restructuring and technical innovation of the enterprises. Through the reform, some
SOEs have been changing the way of producing products with the input of new
technologies from other regions or abroad. The reform started from the early 1990s
and was institutionalized after the Fifteenth Communist Party Congress in September
1997. During that congress, the central government established a legal structure that
allowed for privatization and even bankruptcy of SOEs (Weller, 1999). The Chinese
Communist Party (CCP)'s Fifteenth National Congress devised a new orientation for
the reform of SOEs, with an emphasis on boosting productivity, using the joint stock
system to clarify ownership, and improving the performance of state-owned
economic entities (C.M. Yeh, 1998).
The SOE reforms since the 1990s also led to the abolishment of the danwei system. In
1995, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Economics and Trades, Ministry of Education,
Ministry of Health, and Ministry of Labor jointly issued a legal document to initiate
the separation of the production function and social-service-provision function for
SOEs (Xinhua News, 2002). The document suggested the former SOE-owned danwei
hospitals, danwei schools, and other danwei facilities to be transferred to the local
government or to the market. In addition, social welfare like retirement insurance and
pension began to be provided through the market mechanism. The document
suggested it would take two to three years for SOEs in developed regions and three
to five years for SOEs in less-developed regions to conduct these transfers. In 2004,
the State Council issued another announcement to initiate the second-round danwei
system reform for the following five years, focused on central-government-controlled
SOEs. 16
16 http://chinaneast.xinhuanet.com/2005-01/1 8/content 3587355.htm
As a result, the unique and significant service sector within the SOEs has been
shrinking since then. In the early 1990s, before the SOE reform, about 15% of the
SOE staff was engaged in providing the services as part of the danwei system.
Examples include the education and health care in about 18,000 schools with 6.1
million students, 19,000 nurseries, as well as 224,000 hospitals. About 20% to 35% of
SOE assets were devoted to the provision of social services.17 After the reform, the
SOEs no longer provided these social services to the staff; instead, the provision of
services was put onto the market, either through a developer or other agencies.
5.1.2 Deindustrialization
The privatization of SOEs in China was a huge challenge to its socioeconomic
structure, as well as to its political stability. SOEs constitute a large percent of the
labor force in China and work as the basic social unit of people's daily life. Although
the privation process has been conducted very carefully under the gradualism principal
in order to ensure the social and political stability, there were many protests from
SOE working staff and low-income people since the 1990s. Therefore, there must be
other reasons which led to the marginalization of SOE staff during the SOE
privatization process. I argue that the deindustrialization process was the major one.
Before the SOE reforms, the danwei workers usually lived together in one or more
specific locations, which was planned by the SOE, known as danwei community.
17 China Society (Zhongguo Shehui), 1998, pp. 37 -38
Within these communities, workers could stay at subsidized danwei housing, and share
various social services and facilities provided by the danwei at a lower-than-market rate.
In the late 1990s, due to the new national housing policy, most of this danwei-
subsidized housing was sold at a fairly low price to the staff who formerly stayed
there (Weller, 1999).
From then on, the danwei staff supposedly had the ownership of the housing, while
the land ownership of the danwei communities still belonged to the state. This model
of the danwei community greatly decreased the living cost of the staff since they could
get very affordable social services in the community. In addition, because many of the
SOEs are located in downtown Beijing, especially the manufacturing SOEs, on the
east side: Chaoyang District, staff have easy access to other various services and
retails in the downtown area. The demand created by the large amount of
manufacturing-SOE staff made the downtown part of Beijing more affordable than
other cities without SOE staff living in the downtown, both in terms of housing and
social services. The role of danwei communities in providing subsidized housing to
their staff also reduced the need for public housing, housing owned and subsidized
directly by the central or local governments (Francis, 1996). In 1983 for instance,
25.5% of all housing was owned by the government, 17.0% was owned by individuals,
and 57.5% was owned by SOEs. (Yang, Wang, 1992)
However, the social and economic landscape of downtown Beijing has been changing
due to the deindustrialization process, in which many manufacturing SOEs and
related danwei communities were relocated from downtown Beijing to the suburbs or
other regions. There are various reasons for this large-scale deindustrialization
process in Beijing, among which environmental concerns and SOE privatization are
two major ones. The SOEs in downtown Beijing, especially manufacturing SOEs,
produce much pollution in the city, causing huge social costs and environmental
concerns, both domestically and internationally. The pollution of these SOEs
includes air, solid-waste, water, and land, which has caused many environmental
problems in the city. The other reason for deindustrialization in Beijing is the SOE
privatization. Most downtown SOEs that were making losses experienced the
privatization and reform process, in which many of them need to obtain new
equipment, technologies, more skilled workers, and improved management methods.
However, they have limited financial resources to initiate the reform in the enterprise,
but they usually own the LUR of a large piece of industrial land, which is located in
downtown Beijing. This became a good funding source, especially after the mid 1990s,
when the real estate market became considerably more active, and land conveyance
became the major way to transfer the LURs. Many SOEs sold the land of their
factories to other commercial developers and relocated to the suburbs where they
could get cheaper land. The land price gap was usually used to pay off the debt as
well as to finance the SOE reform. Therefore, to some extent, deindustrialization in
Beijing worked as a financing tool to initiate the central government-led SOE reform
and privatization.
Deindustrialization has created a large amount of land available in downtown Beijing
for redevelopment, especially from the mid 1990s to 2003 when plenty of industrial
land was converted to other uses, such as residential, commercial, and retail. It has led
to a rapidly growing real estate market and has greatly augmented housing prices in
Beijing. In the late 1980s, the real estate investment in Beijing was below 3 billion
yuan each year. The investment in the real estate market had its first sharp increase in
1995, increasing from 9.72 billion yuan in 1994 to 35.58 billion yuan in 1995 (Figure
5-1). The investment kept rising in Beijing's real estate market, and reached 152.5
billion yuan in 2005, which was nearly 84 times than that of 1987.
Figure 5-1: Real Estate Investment in Beijing, 1987-2005
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The increasing investment in the real estate market has also led to housing prices that
are much higher than before the deindustrialization. The average housing price was
below 2,800 yuan per square meter before 1995 (Figure 5-2). In 1996, after a sharp
increase of investment in the real estate market, the housing price also experienced a
big increase, from 3,226 yuan per square meter to 4,057 yuan per square meter. It
kept rising until 1997 when the price reached 5,357 yuan per square meter and began
to drop after that. However, this just reflects the housing price across the whole city,
while I assume the housing price of downtown Beijing would reflect a different
pattern, which probably kept rising even after 1997. The major reason for the housing
price drop in Beijing after 1997 was due to the large amount of lower-price housing
built in the suburbs to accept the residents relocated from downtown area.
Figure 5-2: Average Housing Price in Beijing, 1989- 2004
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Therefore, the working staff of SOEs have been facing dual challenges during this
transition period. The privatization of SOEs in Beijing has abolished the traditional
danwei system, which decreased the provision of subsidized social service and social
welfare formerly provided by the SOEs. The deindustrialization has brought a much
less-affordable housing market in downtown Beijing, while the working staff have to
move out of the subsidized downtown danwei housing and relocate to a comparatively
affordable suburb area. This social and economic transition was supposed to be
conducted gradually in order to ensure the political and social stability. Unfortunately,
the two processes happened nearly simultaneously in Beijing, which has caused
considerable burden for the SOE staff.
The SOE privatization started from the early 1990s and was institutionalized after the
Fifteenth Communist Party Congress in September 1997. The number of sales of
LURs reflects the number of industrial relocation and thus reflects the process of
deindustrialization (Figure 5-3). As we can see, the deindustrialization through land
conveyance market started from the early 1990s, and it experienced a sharp increase
in 1997, right after the Fifteenth Communist Party Congress. (Lee, 2000)
5.1.3 Working Class of SOEs
It is important to study the employment status of the staff during the SOE
privatization and deindustrialization process, because that indicates the condition and
Figure 5-3: Number of Sales of Land Use Rights in Beijing, 1992- 2005
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demand of the SOE staff for housing and other goods after the deindustrialization,
and thus could help to check the economic effect of the land-use policy.
One of the root causes of the SOE unprofitability is the retention of superfluous
workers (Lee, 2000). In May 1997, the State commission for Economic Restructuring
(SCER) predicted that 15-20 million surplus workers in the state sector would lose
their jobs by 2000, and, in turn, estimated the total number of surplus workers in
SOEs at 54 million, close to one-half of the total work-force (Hassard, Morris,
Sheehan, 2002). In 1998, the Labor Ministry announced that the urban
unemployment-exclusive of laid-off workers-is about 5.7 million, which is 3.1% of
the labor force. According to various estimates, the hidden unemployment reached
20 million, about 12% of all urban workers (Table 5-2).
Table 5-2: Labor Forces and Estimated Unemployment in China, 1996 (million)
Rural Urban Total
Total Population 860 340 1,200
Labor Force 834
Employed 490 148 689
Unemployment 40- 67.2 5.7 (3.1%)
Hidden Unemployment 120- 180 (31%) 20 (12%) 140- 200 (27%)
Source: Lee, 2000
In Beijing, there has also been a significant decrease in the SOE employment since
1992, when there was a peak in employment. There was a 46.3% of decrease in
employment, from 3.7 million in 1992 to 1.9 million in 2004 (Figure 5-4). Looking
specifically at the second-sector SOEs, which include most of the industrial SOEs,
there was also a decrease in employment from 1992, except after 2000, due to a
change of the classification of employment (Figure 5-5).
However, the unemployment discussed above does not include some other types of
laid-off workers who literally lost their opportunities to work at the SOE. There are
usually six ways to terminate the labor relationship with the SOE staff.18 (1) A one-
time payment (mai duan gong ling): the SOE and staff negotiate and terminate the labor
contract, the SOE needs to make a one-time payment as the compensation to the
staff, which equals the average annual salary of pervious year times the number of the
years this staff has worked in the SOE. (2) Policy retirement (zheng ce xing tui xiu): the
1 Interview with Mr. Weiyi Yang, the General Secretary of Beijing Printing Group, January. 10, 2007
Figure 5-4: Employment in State-Owned Enterprises in Beijing, 1978- 2004
(thousand persons)
thousand persons
4000
3500
3000
2500
2000
1500
1000
500
0
0 C Flo 0 0C Cq It C. 0 0 C) ' C
L__ 00 00 00 M~ M~ M~ M~ M C C 0
M. 1 M M~ M~ CCD
Note: Data from 1981-1984 not available
Source: Beijing Statistical Yearbook, 2005
Figure 5-5: Employment of the Second Sector in State-Owned Enterprises in Beijing,
1978- 2004 (thousand persons)
Note: (1) Data from 1981-1984 not available
(2) From 2001, related indicators of employment have been adjusted
Source: Beijing Statistical Yearbook, 2005
staff who work at a toxic or polluted working environment can apply to retire before
the age of 60 (which is the normal retirement age), and once they are formally retired,
they can get various social welfare benefits provided by either the municipal
government or the market. (3) Local transfer (jiu di an hZi): transfer the staff from the
SOE to the new tertiary sectors developed by this SOE and get wage from that new
entity. (4) Voluntary termination: the staff voluntarily terminates the labor contract
with the SOE, and find own ways to make a living or find other jobs. (5) Internal
retirement (nei tuz): staff could retire within the SOE before the age of 60 and get part
of social welfare until they formally retire and then get the social welfare from the
municipal government or the market, and (6) laid-off workers (xia gang: staff stop
working for the SOE, but are still retained by the original SOE with partial wage,
until they either retire or get back to work once there are jobs available.
China still cannot be said to have a functioning labor market (Child, 1994; Ding and
Akhtar, 2001, Ding et al., 2000; Warner, 1995, 1999). There is very limited mobility
for SOE staff-the SOE staff traditionally do not transfer to other SOEs once they
start working at one SOE. They learned specific skills in the SOE and many of the
skills are not easily transferred. Therefore, it is difficult for them to find another job
after they lose the job from the SOE. In addition, many of the SOE staff are low- or
mid-income people, especially in the manufacturing SOEs-many of them do not
have much saving even after 30 years of working in the SOE. The average wage of
manufacturing SOE staff in Beijing in 2004 was 23,977 yuan, while the average wage
for all sectors was 34,009 yuan (Table 5-3). The huge social and economic transition
has caused many impacts on the SOE staff, many of which are negative. Although
the "stability" is one of the three key factors together with "security and corruption"
for central government to evaluate the SOE leaders,19 no appropriate policies,
especially the land-use policies, have been made to solve these problems.
Table 5-3: Average Wage and SOE Wage for Each Sector in Beijing, 2004 (RMB)
Average Wage SOE Wage
Farming, Forestry, Animal
Husbandry and Fishery
Mining
Manufacturing
Electricity, Gas, Water Production
Construction
Transportation
Information and Computer Serivce
Wholesale Trade
Hotel and Restaurant
Finance
Real Estate
Tenancy and Commercial
Technical Service
Environment Engineering
Resident Serivce
Education
Health Care and Social Warefare
Culture
Public Management
Average
14,677
20,392
22,338
41,854
20,606
24,628
62,200
27,264
17,965
80,785
27,675
26,516
41,160
25,609
16,735
32,625
39,678
38,817
38,038
29,674
20,979
18,606
23,977
51,723
26,017
25,125
64,930
36,514
19,138
78,046
29,104
21,048
43,773
26,759
25,203
34,280
42,571
44,438
38,243
34,009
Source: Beijing Statistical Yearbook 2005
19 Interview with Mr. Weiyi Yang, the General Secretary of Beijing Printing Group, January. 10, 2007
5.2 Social Impacts of Land Policy
The former land-use planning system, known as the LDCM in China, was highly
discretionary and arbitrary (Zhu, 2005). It did not deal with the various social and
housing issues caused from the deindustrialization process as well as the SOE
privatization process. In that period, the low- and midle-income SOE staff usually
lost the job during the SOE privatization process, and they had to relocate to
outskirts or suburbs during the deindustrialization process, where they need to
purchase the market-rate housing instead of former subsidized danwei housing and
have less access to the diverse subsidized social services which they could get from
the downtown.
The result has been a loss of social cohesion in downtown Beijing and the unbalanced
development of employment-generating uses and residential uses. Many industries
moved to the suburbs, which created both unemployment and labor relocation.
Residential and commercial activities were proposed as new uses on the industrial
sites, which brought more residents into the downtown despite the fact that job
opportunities were being moved out to the periphery or even to other regions. There
has been a 1.8% job loss-60,893 jobs-in the central downtown area of Beijing
within one year from 2003 to 2004, while there was a 16.8% job increase-i 75,817
jobs-in the suburbs of Beijing from 2003 to 2004 (Table 5-4). I assume the data
between 1997 and 2003-the period when there were much more land conveyance
and redevelopment-were much larger than this, which indicated the larger
unbalanced development in downtown Beijing. This fact was due to the former
LDCM discussed in the previous chapter. The LDCM before LCR in 2004 was a
"developer-coordinated process", which emphasized the benefits to the real estate
developers because they were coordinating the DDCP Amendment application
process and negotiating with various government agencies in terms of the planning
parameters including land uses, FAR, etc.
Table5-4: Employment in Each District in Beijing, 2003-2004
Dongcheng
Xicheng
Chongwen
Central-Town Xuanwu
Beijing Chaoyang
Fengtai
Shijingchan
Haidian
Central Total
Mentougou
Fangshan
Tongzhou
Shunyi
Suburbs Beijing Chanpine
Daxing
Pinggu
Huairou
Miyun
Yanqing
Suburb Total
Total Beijing
2003
349,199
477,399
125,272
238,049
727,536
382,350
152,389
837,174
3,289,368
60,877
135,957
116,595
150,195
159,129
185,823
67,983
58,348
71,442
40,054
1,046,403
4,335,771
2004
336,364
472,416
92,344
197,219
745,271
377,517
141,969
865,375
3,228,475
56,375
154,528
169,461
203,669
198,522
180,320
66,577
70,369
80,887
41,512
1,222,220
4,450,695
Employment Change (2004-2003/2003)
-3.7%
-1.0%
-26.3%
-17.2%
2.4%
-1.3%
-6.8%
3.4%
-1.9%
-7.4%
13.7%
45.3%
35.6%
24.8%
-3.0%
-2.1%
20.6%
13.2%
3.6%
16.8%
2.7%
Source: Beijing Statistical Yearbook, 2005.
Since the LCR from negotiation approach to auction approach, there has been an
institutional shift for the land-use planning process: from the former "developer-
coordinated process" to the current "BLRMC-coordinated process". It has led to
more municipal government's intervention during the land-redevelopment process. It
potentially enables the government to solve the issues that appeared due to the SOE
privatization and deindustrialization process, specifically, to provide housing and
social services for the low and middle-income SOE staff after the former danwei
community and the SOE were relocated. After the LCR, smaller percentages of
residential uses were proposed while more commercial and office land uses which
could generate jobs were proposed in order to balance the job and housing rate in
Beijing (Figure 5-6).
Figure 5-6: Urban Land Leasing by Land-Use Type in Beijing, 2002- 2005
Source: BLRMC, and Sun (2005)
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However, I found that after the LCR in 2004, there were literally no cases in which
municipal government and planning agencies successfully retained a certain amount
of SOE staff in the downtown Beijing, where the original SOE and danwei
communities are located, through land conveyance and redevelopment.20 After the
SOE and danwei communities were relocated, the land was usually redeveloped to
market-rate housing or commercial uses with certain type of social services that were
only accessible to the residents who could afford to stay in the area-the LCR did
not fundamentally solve this problem.
5.3 Alternative Non-Market Approach: Beijing Cotton Textile Factory
Beijing Cotton Textile Factory (ing Mian, as it is pronounced in Chinese) is the only
large-scale SOE and danwei community redevelopment case in Beijing, in which a high
percentage of low-income staff were retained in the new housing development on the
original site in downtown. The development and planning were conducted in a
unique alternative way, which was not through the land conveyance in the market and
thus not applicable to many other enterprises or cities. I explore the experiences and
lessons to be leaned in order to analyze this alternative land-redevelopment approach.
5.3.1 History and Introduction
20 Through interviewing with various planners, developers, and SOE managers in Beijing from June, 2006 to January,
2007.
Jing Mian was established in the mid 1950s, during China's first Five-Year Plan
period in Beijing. During that time, the textile industry was considered one of the key
industries in China as well as in Beijing. A large amount of skilled staff moved to join
Jing Mian from Shanghai, Tianjin, and Qingdao to "contribute to building the textile
industry in the capital." In the 1950s, it was the most important textile industry
cluster in Beijing, and it had more than 150,000 staff since its establishment at that
time.
The spatial pattern of Jing Mian is a relatively typical example of the danwei system.
The three Jing Mian plants (No. 1, No. 2, and No. 3) and the three corresponding
Jing Mian danwei communities are located adjacent to each other in Chao Yang district,
the east part of Beijing (Figure 5-7). The three plants are located east of the East 4th
Ring Road, north of Jian Guo Road, west of Shi Fo Ying Road, and south of Chao Yang
Road. The three communities are located just across the Chao Yang Road, east of the
East 4th Ring Road, north of Chao Yang Road, South of Er Dao Creek, and West of
the Shi Fo Ying Road (Figure 5-8). The staff of each plant live in each danwei
community, and spend less than five minutes walking to work. The three
communities occupy 81 hectares of land, and there were various social services within
the communities, including hospitals, schools, and community centers. In the 1960s
and the 1970s, some staff moved to other areas of the city, and some newly recruited
staff moved to Jing Mian communities. In the 1990s, a couple of high-rise buildings
were developed in order to accept more staff.
In the 19 50s, when Jing Mian was established, the location was on the outskirts of the
city. As time went on, the urban sprawl in Beijing, especially in the 1990s when the 3rd
Ring Road and the 4t Ring Road were built, has extended the downtown boundary
to Jing Mian's location. Currently, Jing Mian is just one block away from the Central
Business District (CBD) of Beijing. Beginning from the mid 1990s, the textile
industry in China experienced a huge fall and many textile plants
Figure 5-7: Location of Jing Mian (Beijing Cotton Textile
Source: Land-Use Plan of Jing Mian Area, Beijing Planning Institute, 2002
Figure 5-8: Location of Jing Mian Plants and Jing Mian Communities
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factories were not well managed and could not make a profit. Jing Mian factories
began to be relocated to the suburb Shun Yi district in the late 1990s. Jing Mian sold
the land of the No. 3 plant to the Zhong Yuan real estate group (using the negotiation
method) in 2001. This land conveyance helped Jing Mian to repay the debt and loans
they had and facilitated the relocation and purchase of new equipment.24 In 2005,
after the LCR, Jing Mian sold the land of the No. 1 plant to Beijing Shou Chuang a
major real estate firm in Beijing, through the land auction method. Until January 2007
when I was investigating the plant, only the No. 2 plant was still running. The land of
the Jing Mian plants were planned mostly for residential uses, with some social
24 Interview with Mr. Lin, the General Manager of Jing Mian Group on January 11, 2007.
service uses, such as a high school and a hospital. A couple of gated housing projects
were already developed when I was doing surveys there in January 2007-they were
mid or high-end housing development with an average price of 8,000-10,000 yuan per
square meter.
Different from the commercial housing development on the three Jing Mian plants,
the three Jing Mian communities had their own social and demographic conditions.
The redevelopment of these communities started from mid 1990s and experienced
many difficulties. The three communities were developed in the 1950s, together with
the plants, in order to accommodate the staff recruited from Beijing and other cities.
Since then, many residential buildings were built for new Jing Mian staff. Most of the
residential buildings in the community are three- or four-floor buildings and were
built in the 1950s. There are also some five- or six-floor buildings, which were built in
the 1970s and the 1980s. Several high-rise residential buildings were developed in the
1990s. The total building floor area is 1 million square meters, among which 8.6
million square meters is residential use and 1.4 million square meters is social service
use.
In 2002, there were 16,448 households living in the three Jing Mian communities,
among which 12,000 households were Jing Mian staff. Most of them are either
technical staff or retired staff of Jing Mian. They live in a poor condition-among the
12,000 Jing Mian staff households: 3,385 of them need to share kitchen and
bathroom with others; 2,600 of them have less than six square meters of living space
per person. Among the total 164 buildings, 96 of them were classified by the
government as "under poor and dangerous condition." Like many other SOEs,
numerouse Jing Mian staff either lost their jobs or became laid-off workers during the
Jing Mian restructuring and deindustrialization process. Those staff would prefer to
stay in the downtown area where they can get more social services and easy access to
transportation, and are close to their social network, instead of being relocated to
suburbs. Before the redevelopment, Jing Mian staff, who stayed in the three
communities conducted a survey, and more than 90% of them wanted to stay in
downtown. However, the current land use planning system in Beijing makes it
extremely difficult for either the SOE or developer to accommodate a large number
of SOE staff in the new development on the original site without any incentives. The
LCR in 2004 did lead to more government intervention during the land-use planning
process. Nevertheless, the incentive system was not established and that left the
fundamental problems unsolved.
Finally, in the current plan, 87% of the Jing Mian households would be able to move
back to the new housing development on the site, and that is due to the collaboration
between Jing Mian and Beijing municipal government. They adopted a unique way
that is not through the land-conveyance market like most other redevelopment
projects are supposed to do.
5.3.2 Planning Process
In 1999, Beijing Urban Planning Institute and Beijing Urban Planning Committee
approved the "Detail Development-Control Plan for Downtown Beijing", which
covered Jing Mian communities. In that plan, the residential buildings in this area
have the building-height limit of 18 meters and maximum FAR as 1.6. However, as
one of the features of the Beijing land-use planning system, that plan did not consider
the relocation of the Jing Mian staff; thus, the plan did not create any incentive to
retain some on the original site after the redevelopment. During that period, Decree
No. 87 issued by Beijing Municipal Government was used as a major legal document
to compensate the residents for their relocation. Residents got compensation
according to the size of their former apartment, which was usually very small. The
compensation they got from the government did not let them purchase a new
apartment on the original site; instead, they could only go to suburbs where the
housing price might be a little bit cheaper. Because a high percentage of residents
expressed the interest of not moving to other areas after the redevelopment, Decree
No. 87 was not very useful in Jing Mian case.
In 2000, Beijing Municipal Government issued another regulation "Decree No.19"
which is also called "housing reform and improvement" (fang gai dai weigaz). Decree
No. 19 provided opportunities for SOEs to develop the land by themselves instead of
by real estate developers through land conveyance, in order to retain some SOE staff
in the downtown. This regulation was used before Jing Mian in some downtown
residential area revitalization projects. The managers of Jing Mian applied to the
Beijing municipal government for using this policy to redevelop the three
communities due to the large demand from the staff.
In 2001, several city leaders of Beijing approved the application and expressed strong
support to Jing Mian leaders. Jia Qing-Lin, the former general secretary of Beijing,
Liu Qi, the former mayor of Beijing, and Wang Guang-Tao, the former deputy mayor
of Beijing all approved the application and forwarded memo to various city agencies.
After that, Jing Mian established its own development corporation to take specific
redevelopment work. Jing Mian also submitted a DDCP amendment application to
the Beijing Urban Planning Institute and requests an amendment to the DDCP which
was approved in 1999. Beijing Urban Planning Institute conducted feasibility studies
and various meetings and finally approved this application in August, 2002. The new
building-height limit was adjusted to 80 meters instead of 18 meters; the FAR was
adjusted to 3.5 instead of 1.6. In addition, some part of the Jing Mian No. 3
community was allowed to be put on the land-conveyance market and sold to
developers through land auction and to be developed by real estate developers. This
was also requested by Jing Mian in order to finance the redevelopment and
construction. Since then, the development corporation within Jing Mian has been
constantly negotiating with each household about the compensation and options of
moving back. The corporation aims at retaining 11,393 Jing Mian staff households in
the new housing development, which will be 87% of the total households (Table 5-5).
Table 5-5: Floor Area and Household Budget for Jing Mian Community
Redevelopment
Total Area Planned Area Reserved Area Note
Total Floor Area (10 thousand sq.m) 158.34 122.01 36.33
Residential 134.32 102.99 31.33
For Jing Mian staff 106.03 85.45 20.58
For commercial sales 28.29 17.54 10.75
School 4.44 4.44 0.00
Social Service 19.43 14.43 5.00
Infrastrcture 0.15 0.15 0.00
Total Households 17,007.00 13,147.00 3,860.00
For Jing Mian staff 14,196.00 11,393.00 2,803.00 75 sq.r/household
For commercial sales 2,811.00 1,754.00 1,057.00 100 sq.nhousehold
Total Population 54,423.00 42,071.00 12,352.00 3.2 persons/household
Note: sq m = square meters
Source: Detail Development-Control Plan for Jing Mian Community, Beijing Urban
Planning Institute, 2002
The living space of the staff is improved in the new housing projects, depending on
how individual staff negotiate with the development corporation. Generally, for staff
who used to stay in a room between 20 and 30 square meters, an apartment with two
bedrooms is offered; for staff who used to stay in a room between 30 and 40 square
meters, an apartment with three bedrooms is offered; for staff who used to stay in a
room over 40 square meters, an apartment with three bedrooms is offered, and
additionally, the staff is offered either cash or another apartment, depending on how
big the former room is.
Staff who agree on the compensation will temporarily move to other rental places
until the new apartments are built. However, the negotiation process between
individual staff and the Jing Mian was very complicated and greatly affected the
redevelopment process of the three communities, but that analysis is beyond the
scope of my research.
CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION
1 have made several unique contributions to the field of land-use policy changes in
China, which I first summarize and then I indicate the limitations of the study and
future work needed.
6.1 Contributions
In this study, I examine the recent land-use policy changes in China and their
institutional impact on the land-use planning process as well as social impacts on the
ongoing deindustrialization process. My empirical study in Beijing provides some
interesting data about the deindustrialization since the 1990s, especially, the condition
of the SOE staff who were facing dual challenges during China's transition period. I
also conducted many interviews of various agencies, SOE managers, developers, SOE
staff and scholars to analyze how the land conveyance reform affected the
institutional settings of the land redevelopment process. I answer several questions
and contribute the following to the land-use knowledge for China:
(1) I study the history and the motivation of the ongoing deindustrialization process
in Beijing which mainly started from the mid 1990s. By comparing various data
on industrial land conversion, factory location, industrial output and major
industry sector, I outline the big picture of the industrial land conversion and
redevelopment. In addition, for background, I explore the legal and institutional
context.
(2) I study the institutional impacts of the land conveyance reform by focusing on
issues like land property rights, legislation, as well as relevant city agencies and
developers. The industrial land-redevelopment process is a process for the Beijing
municipal government to generate and distribute revenu . The land-conveyance
reform from the negotiation approach of selling the LURs to the auction
approach has changed the way that various government agencies as well as former
and new land users participate in the land-conversion process. This change has
caused an institutional shift for one of the central elements of the LDCM: ORTP,
from the former "developer-coordinated process" to the current "BLRMC-
coordinated process."
(3) The working class of SOEs in China has been facing dual challenges
simultaneously: the decrease of their access to the social services and social
welfare as well as the burden to be relocated from the subsidized housing in the
downtown area to commodity housing at suburbs. The challenges do not fit in
with China's gradual-reform approach and have caused many protests and
criticism from below. I argue that the key reason for the dual challenges is China's
unique situation-the deindustrialization process goes hand-in-hand with
privatization of SOEs since the mid 1990s. My research shows that the LCR does
not solve the problem; instead, it just slows down the occurrence of the problems.
The redevelopment of Jing Mian communities successfully retained a high
percentage of low-income staff in downtown Beijing. However, it was conducted
in a unique non-market way, which might not be applicable to most other
industrial land redevelopment.
6.2 Limitations and Future Research
During my survey in Beijing, it was difficult to get specific information on industrial
land conversion. No comparable data for the same geographic area were available.
The industrial land data I finally used were from various sources and covered
different geographic areas. However, it gave me a big picture of the
deindustrialization process. In addition, I could improve the study by obtaining more
micro-level data on spatial pattern of employment as well as micro-level data on SOE
staff, such as income changes, living costs, and access to social services.
Moreover, my study does not capture the informal dimensions of the land-
development-control mechanism. That is beyond the scope of my research; however,
it is extremely important and greatly affected both interactions among various
agencies and relocation of the SOE staff. Other analysts should study this in the
future.
The LCR and related land policies in China greatly reflect the political and social
outcome, especially in the current deindustrialization and downtown redevelopment
period. Relevant studies on these topics will be extremely useful, and my initial
exploration lays the foundation for future studies.
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APPENDIX
Photos of Jing Mian Communities
All the photos were taken by Zhiyu Chen on January 11, 2007.
Photo 1
The Jing Mian No.2
community under
redevelopment. (The
residential buildings far
in the photo were
developed by real
estate developer on the
Jing Mian plant).
Photo 2
Newly built residential
buildings for Jing Mian
staff in Jing Mian No.3
community. (The 6-
floor residential
building was not
removed because there
were 2 households in
that building who have
not accepted the
compensation from
Jing Mian.)
Photo 3
The high-end gated
community developed
by real estate developer
on the Jing Mian plant.
Photo 4
The new retail and social
service developed by real
estate developer on the
Jing Mian plant, which is
not quite affordable to
the Jing Mian staff.
Photo 5
Typical existing
residential buildings in
Jing Mian communities,
which were built in the
1950s.
Photo 6
Existing alley and
landscape in the Jing
Mian No.2 community,
which will be destroyed
after the redevelopment.
.......... ........
Photo 7
Existing high-rise residential building in Jing
Mian community which was built in the 1990s.
(These buildings will be retained in the new
plan.)
Photo 8
Existing health-care facility
in Jing Mian community
(mixed use with residential
buildig).
Photo 9
Existing residential building in Jing Mian
community which will be demolished soon. (The
cross on the window indicates that the household
has agreed on the compensation and has moved
out)
Photo 10
Existing informal-sector
retail and social service
in jing Mian community,
run by individual
household. (Such a tiny
corner retail provides
lots of daily service
residents need.)
Photo 11
Existing entertainment
facility in the Jing Mian
community-a kid playing
outdoor "snooker" game.
Photo 12
Existing major open
space in the Jing Mian
communty.
